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XSummary
The purpose of this thesis is to examine whether the interpersonal relatedness approach or 
the metarepresentational (or "theory of mind") approach is a more adequate explanation of 
the symbolic play of children with autism. This was attempted first, by a comparative 
theoretical analysis of evidence presented in support of both theories to date, and second, 
by inclusion of affective and attentive variables in empirical studies of symbolic play in 
children with and without autism. The roles of affect and attention were crucial, because 
they are implicit in the interpersonal relatedness theory of symbolic development, but not 
considered at any length in the metarepresentational approach as it was originally proposed.
Current evidence in favour of both theories is presented in chapter I. It was found that 
findings from studies of 'false belief and symbolic play in autism suggest a 'cognitive 
deficit' (metarepresentational impairment), but there are also a number of'affective' 
impairments which cannot be predicted by such a deficit. It was found that both theories 
do not have total empirical support.
Five empirical studies are presented in chapters 2-7. The influence of a musical stimulus 
on the symbolic play of children with and without autism is examined in chapters 2 and 4.
It was found that more elicited symbolic play (which requires the child to produce the 
symbolic idea) was demonstrated by children without autism on the inclusion of a musical 
stimulus. The children with autism were not influenced by the music.
An attempt was then made to examine the role of affect and attention during symbolic play, 
by the development of a rating scale to measure perceived affective mood and attention-to- 
tasks, in chapters 3, 4, 5 and 6. The scale is used in chapters 4 and 6 to examine 
relationships of symbolic play, affective mood, and attention to tasks in children with and 
without autism. Some relationships between symbolic play, affect and attention were 
found in the children with autism. It was also found that over three occasions the children 
with autism looked at the experimenter less than the other children.
The possibility of a symbolic impairment in children with autism was examined in chapters 
4,6 and 7. Findings were inconsistent, probably because of methodological inconsistency 
between studies, and flaws in design. Because of this lack of consistent evidence it was 
not possible to support one of the theories and reject the other.
The general discussion (chapter 8) suggests that we cannot choose between the 
metarepresentational and interpersonal theories on the basis of current evidence, but there 
remain good reasons for both theories to continue to generate hypotheses to be tested. It is 
also suggested that recent integrative theories such as that of Baron-C’ohen (1994) might 
bridge the theoretical opposition of I^eslie and Hobson.
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"Melanie Klein (Klein. 1930) raised the problem of inhibition in symbol 
formation. She described an autistic little boy of four, Dick, who could not talk 
or play; he showed no affection or anxiety... There resulted a paralysis of his 
phantasy life and of symbol formation. He had not endowed the world around 
him with any symbolic meaning and therefore took no interest in it"
(Segal, 1988; p.163)
1Chapter 1
A Comparative Analysis of the Theories Explaining the Symbolic Play of 
Children with Autism
1.1 Introduction
The purpose of this thesis is to examine whether the metarepresentational (or "theory of 
mind") approach or the interpersonal relatedness approach is a more adequate explanation 
of the symbolic play of children with autism. A lack of symbolic (imaginative or pretend) 
play is a feature of the syndrome which is widely considered to be of key importance in 
understanding the disorder.
The two approaches to autism will be considered in depth. The first approach comes from 
cognitive neuropsychology, and is known as the "theory of mind" explanation. Central to 
this explanation is the decoupler performance model, proposed by Alan I^eslie in 1987 as 
the means by which certain representations are 'decoupled' into symbolic 
metarepresentations. It will be seen that this approach is an information processing 
account of autism, described in computational terms.
The second approach is that proposed by R. Peter Hobson (e.g. 1990a, 1990b, 1993). 
This approach may be broadly viewed as 'social' although this is partially due to its 
contrast to the 'theory of mind' approach, and comes from the perspective of 
developmental psychopathology. Central to this approach is the concept of interpersonal 
relatedness which is argued to be non-computational and an essential dynamic in the 
development of language, thought and symbolic abilities.
Both of these approaches claim links between their respective key concepts 
(metarepresentation and interpersonal relatedness) and children's developing awareness of
2the psychological states of other people. Therefore, it will he seen that research into 
symbolic play and research into awareness of others' mental states are related. However, 
this thesis is primarily concerned with the nature of symbolic play and how this differs for 
children with autism. Both theories consider this.
It will first be useful to define symbolic play, and autism as a syndrome, before examining 
the evidence for particular cognitive and affective impairments in autistic people.
Following evaluation of this evidence the theoretical bases for each particular approach are 
presented, with particular reference to how each approach explains symbolic play and the 
symbolic play of children with autism. Finally, some alternative approaches to autism are 
briefly considered.
1.2 What is Symbolic Play?
Fundamentally, symbolic play is behaviour which is simulative or non-literal (Fein,
1981). where (he individual acts as if something were the case when in reality it is not 
(e.g. Leslie, 1987). Originally F*iaget (1962) contended that symbolism emerges during 
the period of sensorimotor development as a distinction appears between the signifier (the 
present object or action) and the signified (the absent object or action).
There are developmental processes in symbolic play development which have been 
identified in the research, specifically decentration, which involves moving from the self 
as the agent of pretence to others as the agent of pretence ( I .owe, 1975), 
decontextualisation, which involves moving away from realistic objects to produce 
pretence (Jackowit/. and Watson, 1980). and integration, which involves the gradual 
inclusion of several play acts to form sequences (Fenson and Ramsay, 1980). All three of 
these phenomena reflect a child’s growing awareness of the social world and creative 
independence.
Most authors agree that there is a social context to much symbolic play. This is 
highlighted by the work of Flaight and Miller (1992) who engaged in a longitudinal study 
of symbolic play development in nine 'middle class' children in the United States. The 
children were observed in naturalistic settings from age 12 months to 48 months. The 
authors found that play occurred predominantly in interaction with others throughout the 
observation period. Whilst play was predominantly mother-and-child until 36 months, 
after 36 months play was equally mother-child and child-child. Both mothers and children 
initiated play, although it was the parents who tended to elaborate the play, and prompt 
new elements of play. It was also found that parents' talk was incorporated into the 
child's solo play. This study is important as it emphasises the difference between pretend 
play with a partner and solo pretend play.
4The actions which themselves are pretended can be viewed as comprising different types. 
For example, Jarrold (personal communication) has examined physical, emotional and 
social symbolic play actions. Clearly these different forms of play might signify different 
cognitive processes. Jarrold's study shall be examined further when we consider the 
evidence fora symbolic play impairment in autistic children.
Symbolic play tends to become complex as development progresses. For example, Howes 
and Matheson (1992) examined the sequences in the development of competent symbolic 
play with peers, in 48 children aged 10-59 months. The pattern of play forms and the 
proportion of time in complex play patterns were found to relate to indices of social 
competence. The authors suggest that complex symbolic play requires available adult and 
peer interaction. Incidentally, they found that the 48 children, who attended a 'model' 
child care centre, showed symbolic play earlier and with greater complexity than 259 
controls w ho attended minimally adequate child care centres.
A very important distinction is whether or not the child has the symbolic idea provided or 
whether they generate the idea themselves (generative symbolic play). Examples of non- 
generative symbolic play are instructed and modelled symbolic play; examples of 
generative play are spontaneous and elicited symbolic play (I .ewis and Boucher, 1988).
As can be seen in the studies of Lewis and Boucher (1995; 1988) we can have different 
expectations from children depending on the kind of play which is to be examined.
Therefore, symbolic play is an activity which occurs with increasing complexity, 
competence and independence on the part of the child. Physical, social and emotional 
symbolic play may be different in nature, as may be generative and non-gcncrativc 
symbolic play. Social interaction is an important part of symbolic play development. The 
symbolic play examined in this thesis shall be interactive, but mainly comprising physical 
play actions. It will also be non-spontancous, although generative and non-gcncrative 
play shall be contrasted. It is recognised that symbolic play has many other forms, but we
5need to balance experimental control with the need for examination of play w hich truly 
represents the child's social-cognitive development.
1.3 What is Autism?
The first person to recognise autism as a syndrome was Leo Kanner (1943). Kanncr 
reported 11 cases of autism in his original paper, and later suggested five features which 
could be implemented in diagnosis (Eisenberg and Kanner, 1956). These were: a 
profound lack of affective contact with other people; an obsessive desire for sameness; a 
fascination with objects; communication difficulties and poor use of language; and good 
cognitive potential. Kanner felt that the lack of affective contact was the central feature of 
the disorder, producing the other features.
The 'good cognitive potential' feature was based on Kanner's observations that children 
with autism looked intelligent and thoughtful, and that the children of his original 1943 
paper tended to have intelligent, professional parents (I^ewis, 1987). It is now widely 
believed that Kanner overestimated the likelihood that children with autism have good 
cognitive potential.
It has also been proposed that a lack of emotional contact with other people could not be 
the primary feature of autism. For example, Rutter (1983) has argued that the central 
problem in autism must be a cognitive deficit, because the lack of affective contact should 
not lead to the obsessional and communicative features. Rutter proposed a basic cognitive 
deficit, 'basic' in that it is fundamental to the syndrome of autism, and 'deficit' because 
cognitive abilities are not damaged by psychogenic factors.
Thus, the historical growth of cognitive approaches to the conceptualisation of 
psychological disorders has influenced the theoretical and empirical investigation of the 
nature of autism. Wing and Gould (1979), in a very thorough population study, produced
6evidence that there is an association between low IQ and symptoms of autism. Increasing 
percentages of children showed symptoms of autism towards the bottom end of the 
intelligence scale, which might suggest a common cause for the 'social' and 'cognitive' 
elements of autism.
Both of the approaches presented in this thesis identify social delay in autism as a major 
defining feature of the syndrome. Even though most children with autism also 
demonstrate general intellectual delay, they show a specific delay in the awareness of the 
psychological states of other people, which is disproportionately poor in comparison to 
control groups with similar levels of general delay (e.g. Baron-Cohen, Leslie and Frith, 
1985).
Current approaches have therefore come full circle in focussing on the social features of 
autism which Kanner considered central. However, the 'theory of mind' approach 
proposes that the inability of children with autism to 'metarepresent' the mental states of 
other people is due to an innate cognitive deficit or delay. In contrast, Hobson's approach 
actually suggests that the 'innate inability to form the usual, biologically provided affective 
contact with other people' (Kanner, 1943, p.250) can predict the propensity of people 
with autism to be 'asymbolic' and unable to perceive mental states of other people. This 
approach therefore challenges Rutter (1983) in that the underlying deficit of autism need 
not be 'cognitive'.
It is clear that children with autism do not engage in spontaneous symbolic play to the 
same extent as other children (e.g Baron-Cohen, 1987). This can be accounted for by 
both cognitive and conative factors (the importance of conative factors is illustrated by 
Ixwis and Boucher, 1988). Conative factors include a person's drives, will to act, and 
motivation (Oxford Medical Dictionary, 1984). At the risk of repetition, it should be again 
highlighted that there is a relation between poor spontaneous symbolic play, and the

81.4 Empirical Examination of the Social Impairments of Autism
Most authors consider that autistic people suffer primary impairments in social 
understanding, although autism also involves language disorder and a desire for 
sameness. The examination of different elements of social understanding has been quite a 
diverse activity, and several specific impairments seem plausible. These include symbolic 
play, 'theory of mind', reciprocal interactions with peers, joint-attention impairments, 
empathic understanding, emotional expression and emotion perception.
1.4.1 Symbolic Play
Baron-Cohen (1987) examined the extent of the symbolic play of 10 children with autism 
(mean verbal MA1 29 months, mean CA^ 97 months) in comparison with Down's 
Syndrome and mainstreamed '5 controls. The children with Down's Syndrome were 
matched to the children with autism via the British Picture Vocabulary Scale (BPVS).
Play was observed with stuffed animals and wooden blocks, with toy kitchen utensils in a 
toy kitchen, and with play people. Play had to be produced spontaneously, without any 
help from the experimenter.
The types of pretence described by Leslie (1987; see below) were considered as symbolic 
play. No child in any group showed symbolic play with the play people. With the other 
toys, significantly fewer children with autism produced any symbolic play. However, 
l-ewis and Boucher! 1988) suggested that Baron-Cohen's language-matching procedure 
was flawed. The vocabulary of children with autism is generally more advanced than
1 M A=M cnlul Age 
^CA=Chronological Age
*By 'mainstreamed controls' it is meant children who arc cither not seen to have special educational 
needs, or in the case of children not ycl of schixil age. those not anticipated as requiring special 
educational needs pros ision.
9other aspects of their language (Paul, 1987). This casts some doubt on the validity of 
Baron-Cohen's findings.
Ungerer and Sigman (1981) examined the symbolic play of sixteen children with autism 
(mean CA 51.7 months, mean MA 24.8 months). They demonstrated that a structured 
play situation produced levels of symbolic play that were significantly greater than in a 
free play situation, and they proposed that this was due to untapped potential for 
metarepresentation in children with autism. Later, Sigman and Ungerer (1984) included 
controls; in comparison with children with a learning disability and normal children 
matched for mental age, the number of symbolic acts was significantly lower for the group 
of children with autism in both conditions. So, while the symbolic play of children with 
autism could be improved by structuring the situation, it was still poorer than that of the 
controls.
Baron-Cohen (1987) criticised the work of Sigman and Ungerer on the basis that the play 
of the children in their study could reflect simple imitation, since defaulting participants 
had play modelled by the experimenter. However, Sigman and Ungerer did not explicitly 
design the experiment to look at symbolic play with the same emphasis as Baron-Cohen 
(1987).
In a study which specifically aimed to produce symbolic play, Lewis and Boucher (1988) 
compared fifteen children with autism (mean CA=132 months, mean MA 65/51 months) 
with normal and children with moderate learning disabilities, matched by expressive 
verbal ability on the Renfrew Action Picture Test. This test gives two age-equivalent 
scores, one for 'information' and one for 'grammar'. Spontaneous, verbally-elicited, and 
verbally-instructed play conditions were included. There was no significant difference 
between the groups' symbolic play in the spontaneous condition, though this may well 
have been due to the extremely low levels of symbolic play in this condition. The duration 
and quality of symbolic play was not significantly different in the elicited and instructed
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conditions. The study is contentious in that Lewis and Boucher suggested that children 
with autism may suffer from impaired desire to use largely intact symbol structures.
In a reply to a criticism of Baron-Cohen (1990) who suggested that the children with 
autism may simply have been guessing, Lewis and Boucher (1990) demonstrated that the 
play of the children with autism in their study was surprisingly sophisticated. One child 
suggested 'London bridge, car fell in the water' when presented with blocks and a toy car.
Riguet, Taylor, Benaroya and Klein (1981) had also suggested that the optimal conditions 
for observing symbolic play in children with autism would involve structuring the test 
procedure. Riguet et al. used toys in both a spontaneous and a modelled condition. Ten 
children with autism (mean CA 120 months, mean verbal MA 30 months) were matched 
with control groups of children with Down's Syndrome and mainstreamed children. The 
children with autism played less in both conditions, and the authors note that the quality of 
their play was poorer. However, Baron-Cohen (1987) noted that only 'object 
substitution' and not 'reference to absent objects' or 'attribution of nonexistent properties' 
(c.f. Leslie, 1987) were considered 'symbolic' in this study, and so it suffers from a 
serious conceptual flaw.
Wetherby and Prutting (1984) examined symbolic play in the context of 'cognitive-social' 
abilities in four young children with autism (mean CA 114 months). A spontaneous play 
and a modelled play condition were included, and the authors had similar toys to those 
modelled 'around' to test for any generalisation of play. The symbolic play of the children 
with autism was shown to be poorer in quantity and quality than that of four mainstreamed 
children of similar linguistic ability. Curiously the authors do not comment on the 
generalisation ability of the children, nor are the two conditions compared to test for the 
effect of situation structure. On these grounds, and because of the small sample, the study 
is flawed.
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With the significant exception of the Lewis and Boucher (1988) study, these results 
suggest that children with autism lack a competence in symbolic play skills. If one can 
assume that metarepresentation is indeed the underlying ability which allows the 
decoupling of representations from literal perceptions, then it would seem that there is 
indeed support for Leslie's (1987) thesis from research into symbolic play.
Lewis and Boucher (1988) included relatively able children with autism whose symbolic 
delays may well be difficult to detect with contemporary symbolic play tests.
Furthermore, the use of the Renfrew Action Picture Test may have selected very able 
children with autism, since their scores on this test are significantly lower than on tests of 
vocabulary and the comprehension of grammar (Jarrold, Boucher and Smith, 1993).
Also, the anomalous result that the functional play of children with autism was worse than 
that of controls, whilst their symbolic play was comparable, can be accounted for by 
general floor effects in the symbolic play condition.
1.4.2 Theory of Mind'
Hobson (1984) addressed the question of perspective-taking in children with autism. 
Children with autism, controls with Down's Syndrome, and mainstreamed controls were 
included. Hobson devised a series of hide-and-seek problems, using three miniature pipe- 
cleaner figures. Also, the children were asked what one or two dolls could 'see' when 
placed at different angles to a multi-coloured cube. In fact the children with autism were 
comparable in the hide-and-seek tasks, and performed better than the children with 
Down's Syndrome at understanding the doll's 'visual perspective'.
In reporting the above study for the purposes of a review, Hobson (1993) notes John 
Flavell's (1974) point that a young child may be unable to represent to herself someone 
else's 'seeing' experiences, but still understand how to answer correctly the question 
"What am I (you, he) looking at?". This could be achieved by reconstructing it as "What
12
is on your side of the display?" Also, Hobson notes, Shantz (1975) has argued that visual 
perspective-taking is the least 'social' of a number of types of 'social inference'.
In fact, children with autism have no difficulty in understanding person permanence 
(Sigman and Mundy, 1989), visual perspective taking (Hobson, 1984; Baron-Cohen, 
1989b), mirror self-recognition (Dawson and McKissick, 1984), gender recognition 
(Weeks and Hobson, 1987) or face recognition (Goode, 1985). However, Goode (1985) 
has noted that people with autism often use unusual strategies to recognise the faces of 
others.
Leslie (1987) proposed that it is the concept of a person's mental perspective rather than 
their visual perspective which might be deficient in autism. To test this understanding of 
cognitive or mental perspective (rather than visual perspective), Wimmerand Pemer 
(1983) developed a simple test of understanding of false belief in others. False belief is a 
mental state which involves the belief that something is 'true' when in reality it is false. 
Two dolls, named Sally and Anne, have a basket and a box respectively in front of them. 
Sally is shown to place her marble into a basket. She then leaves. While she is away, 
Anne is shown to take a marble from the basket and place it out of view in her own box. 
When Sally returns, the experimenter asks, "Where will Sally look for her marble?" Two 
control questions which do not require understanding of Sally's false belief are also asked; 
"Where is the marble really?" and "Where was the marble at the beginning?" The scenario 
is repeated, but with the marble hidden in the experimenter's pocket.
Baron-Cohen, Leslie and Frith (1985) conducted this procedure with 20 children with 
autism (mean CA 132 months, mean MA 66 months, controls with Down's Syndrome 
who had significantly lower verbal MA and mainstreamed controls. Eighty-five percent of 
the mainstreamed controls and 86% of the children with Down's Syndrome indicated that 
Sally would look in her basket, whereas only 20% of the children with autism did so.
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The same authors (Baron-Cohen, Leslie and Frith, 1986) applied understanding of mental 
perspectives in others to children's understanding of depicted storylines. Some of the 
stories in this study showed mechanical events (e.g. a man rolling a rock down a hill), 
whereas others involved social routines (e.g. a girl buying sweets from a shop). Still 
others involved something happening in which a main figure in the story did not perceive 
that an event had happened, only to find out and show a surprised expression. Similar 
groups to the 1985 study were included. The controls were almost all proficient at 
ordering the storylines no matter whether they involved mechanical events, social routine, 
or false belief in the depicted figure. The children with autism were not proficient at 
sorting the latter type of story. Also, the children with autism did not use mental state 
terms such as 'want', 'know, and 'believe', to explain in their own words what had 
happened in the stories.
Baron-Cohen (1989a) reports three further studies which show a similar pattern of 
specific problems in children with autism. In the first study, pairs of dolls were shown to 
children with autism and controls. The child would be told, "This is Sam. He likes 
biscuits. He is hungry, so his mother gives him a biscuit. This is Kate. She is hungry, 
but she is all alone. She is thinking about a biscuit." Then several questions were asked, 
along the lines of "Which child can eat the biscuit?", as well as "Which child can touch the 
biscuit?". An example of a control question was "Which child was given the biscuit?"
The children with autism performed significantly less well on questions like the first two 
presented above, which needed some representation of the mental perspective of the 
characters. Only a quarter of the children with autism scored at least seven out of eight 
questions correctly. In contrast, over three-quarters of controls could do so.
In the second study reported by Baron-Cohen (1989a) the same subjects were required to 
answer questions about the brain and the heart, in terms of their location and function. 
Both groups answered appropriately about the location and function of the heart, and also
about the location of the brain. However, only one-quarter of the children with autism 
replied that the brain was for 'thinking' or any other mental function. Instead, they were 
more likely to refer to the brain in terms of co-ordinating behaviour - for example, 'It 
makes you move'. Three-quarters of controls spontaneously referred to the function of 
the brain in terms of mental functions.
The third study reported by Baron-Cohen ( 1989a) involved the children with autism and 
controls distinguishing between appearance and reality. In one case, the children were 
shown a plastic chocolate, and asked, "What is it?". All of the children said it was a 
chocolate. They were then invited to handle the chocolate, and asked, "What is it made 
of?". The children replied that it was made of plastic.
The 'appearance' question was "What does it look like?", and the 'reality' question was 
"What is it really?". Only a minority of the children with autism (one third) could make 
the correct distinction, whereas a majority of the controls (two thirds) could do so.
Indeed, many of the children with autism attempted to eat the plastic chocolate, in spite of 
being aware that it was made of plastic. Baron-Cohen ( 1989a) suggests that children with 
autism do not have 'the concept of their own knowledge' which, he suggests, is required 
to conclude that the chocolate only appears to be real. This concept Baron-Cohen holds to 
be metarepresentational.
More recently, Sodian and Frith ( 1992) examined the ability of children with autism to 
understand deception. Sodian and Frith argue that deception requires some capacity for 
inference about the mental states of others. They designed a task where the child was 
given a chance to 'sabotage' the efforts of a nasty wolf-character doll. Also, the child 
could 'thwart' the doll by influencing its inferred beliefs. There was also a condition 
where a 'nice' doll would ask for help, and the child was able to actively 'help' the doll by 
volunteering information.
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The child was given a piece of confectionery and asked to hide it in a box. They were 
then told by the experimenter to help the 'nice smartie friend' or to prevent the 'nasty 
smartie eater' from eating it. In the 'sabotage' condition there was a key to lock the box, 
and the child was asked whether they wanted to lock the box or leave it open. In the 
'deception' condition there was no key, and the child had the task of telling the puppet 
whether or not it was worth walking around to the lock to see if it was open. The puppet 
asked "Is the box locked or is it open?" and the experimenter then said, "What do you 
want to say? Do you want to say it is locked or do you want to say that it is open?". If 
the child lied to the nasty puppet or told the truth to the nice puppet, then the child would 
be given a smartie. They would not be rewarded if they told the truth to the nasty puppet.
When scores were adjusted to allow for subjects' mental ages, it was found that the 
groups were similar in performance in the sabotage condition, but that the children with 
autism were less likely to deceive the nasty puppet whilst telling the truth to the nice 
puppet. However, there are potential difficulties in interpreting these results. The 
children with autism may have perceived correctly the 'mental states' of the nasty puppet. 
The problem is as follows. If the child had perceived the mental state of the experimenter 
(who obviously knows everything that is happening), except for the subtlety that it is 
'okay' to lie in this special 'playful' situation, then it is unclear whether (1) the child does 
not deceive the nasty wolf-character because her capacity for metarepresentation is 
delayed, or (2) the child does not deceive the nasty wolf-character because she has been 
told previously not to lie. Indeed. Hobson (1993) argues that failure to perceive the 
'playful' nature of certain situations may retard the child's propensity to act as if a 
particular situation is 'not-for-serious'. That is to say, the child with autism may lack the 
capacity to metarepresent the 'nasty' intentions of the wolf character, or equally as 
feasibly, the child may lack an 'emotional' ability which flags some affective experiences 
as 'serious' and others as 'not-for-serious'.
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In spite of this possibility, it seems that these results are confirmation that deception is a 
problem in children with autism and that this may be related to the failure to perceive the 
mental states of others.
These studies are methodologically elegant and seem to yield highly reliable results. We 
might suppose on the basis of the above results that a cognitive impairment exists in 
autism which encapsulates both symbolic play and understanding of other people's mental 
states. In fact Baron-Cohen ( 1989b) suggested that theory of mind impairment in autism 
is a case of specific developmental delay. Baron-Cohen recruited children with autism 
from his previous experiments who had passed the Sally-Anne false belief tasks. With 
these children, he applied a complex false-belief story which involved a doll inferring 
what another doll was inferring. This was referred to as a 'second-order' false belief task. 
None of the children with autism could successfully infer the second order false belief of 
the first doll. Baron-Cohen's conclusion was that where children with autism do develop 
some metarepresentational ability, it remains relatively unsophisticated.
1.4.3 Interaction with Peers
Much research has been completed by Lord (1984; Lord and Garfin, 1986; Lord and 
Hopkins, 1986) into the success of peer relations in children with autism. Lord (1984) 
utilised specially-trained mainstreamed peers to elicit social behaviour in six children with 
autism aged around ten years, with the use of facilitatory toys.
First, the children with autism were left to interact together spontaneously. Fifteen 
minutes of this initial interaction were analysed. It was shown that whereas they spent 
about 25% of the time physically oriented towards each other, no child made more than 
four initiations or responses in the whole 15 minutes. When the peers were introduced, 
only one child who had autism made any initiations, and the children with autism 
responded to less than 25% of the peers' attempts to engage them in play.
Several daily 15-minute sessions where peers were included were analysed, with a 
gradual increase in the responsiveness being reported in the children with autism. Some 
even sustained responses beyond a single signal to engage in play with the peer.
However, they continued to demonstrate relatively little eye contact during interaction, 
language use, and the use of objects in non-stereotyped ways.
Ix>rd (1984) noted that success was more likely where the children with autism could 
perceive easily what the peer was asking them to do. She concluded that structuring 
situations improves the number o f prosocial behaviours demonstrated.
McHale (1983) also demonstrated that facilitatory toys such as tricycles can improve the 
amount of time which children with autism spend in peer interaction from 25% at baseline 
to 75% of the time in their final observation. However, in reviewing this study of peer 
interaction in children with autism, Howlin (1986) pointed out that children with autism 
are unlikely to initiate interaction at any point. Also, they are unlikely to make the crucial 
step of reinforcing peers who interact with them, nor are they likely to learn and generalise 
the skills experienced in such interactions.
Children with autism clearly do not engage in reciprocal interactions with peers to the 
same extent as other children. Such peer interaction was proposed by Haight and Miller
(1992) to increase in combination with symbolic play after 36 months, in the course of 
normal development.
1.4.4 Joint-Attention
The one-year old child shows an emerging capacity for sharing each others' feelings and 
objects. By 'sharing', it is meant that the two individuals, infant and carer, show some 
attention to each others' emotions and direction of gaze.
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A study by Wetherby and Prutting (1984) has already been mentioned as providing limited 
support fora symbolic play impairment in autism. They examined four children with 
autism and four mainstreamed controls. Eight situations were analysed where 
communicative exchanges to the experimenter were prompted. For example, the 
experimenter would eat food where the child could clearly see them (thus prompting a 
communication from the child about eating), or the experimenter would read a book which 
the child owned, and so on. Each of the children with autism would manipulate the 
experimenter's behaviour to get the food, but attention was not sought as an end in itself. 
None of the children with autism directed the adult's line of gaze to the object. They did 
not 'show off, label objects, or acknowledge the adult as a reciprocal interacting 
individual. It seemed they were merely objects which could be acted on in certain ways in 
order to provide reinforcement.
Loveland and l^andry (1986) aimed specifically to examine the sharing of emotions and 
objects in children with autism, and assigned controls with a specific language delay 
matched for both verbal and non-verbal intellectual function, as well as mainstreamed 
children. The children with autism were aged between five and 13 years. Each child was 
videotaped playing with one of the experimenters in a playroom, which had freely- 
available toys in it, as in the study by lx>rd (1984). In free-play situations the child's 
attempts to initiate interactions were recorded. Also, the experimenter engaged the child in 
structured scenarios. First, the child would be required to either produce or understand 
personal pronouns ("I've got the |toy |") or demonstratives ("This |toy| is over there1'). 
Alternatively, the child was required to respond to attention-directing gestures such as 
pointing, showing, gaze shifting, or tapping an object. Asa further alternative they could 
be required to combine object-directing behaviours with language ("That is a |toy |"). 
Second, the experimenter would attempt to elicit attention-directing 'requesting' 
behaviours from the child, by placing attractive objects or food just beyond the reach of 
the child.
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It was found that the children with autism were less likely to respond appropriately to 
language and gestures which the experimenter had used to direct their attention. Also, the 
children themselves were less likely to produce pointing and gestures especially in the 
free-play (non-structured) situations. This finding echoes the symbolic play research 
which also highlighted the importance of structured situations in improving the social 
behaviour of children with autism, but not to 'normal' levels. The children with autism in 
this study also demonstrated infrequent use of the terms 'this/that' and 'here/there'. In all 
groups, an association between language abilities and the use of joint-attention gestures 
was found. Possibly, there is a relationship between these domains of function.
Hobson (1993) has reviewed the research into joint-attention behaviours in children with 
autism carried out at UCLA (e.g. Mundy, Sigman and Kasari, 1990; Mundy, Sigman, 
Ungerer and Sherman, 1986, 1987; Sigman, Mundy, Sherman and Ungerer, 1986). In 
this series of studies, young children with autism (between three and six years) were 
tested alongside children with general intellectual delay and no autism. The authors 
adopted the Early Social Communication Scales (ESCS; Seibert, Hogan and Mundy,
1982) in order to assess joint-attention skills. The child and experimenter would sit facing 
each other across a table. A set of toys, including a hat, a comb, a book, a ball, a car, five 
small wind-up mechanical toys and five hand-operated toys were 'on view' but out of the 
child's reach. Colourful posters were on the walls of the room. The toys were presented 
one-at-a time by the experimenter, who would also look at the wall posters every so often. 
The experimenter would also engage the child in physical social games such as tickling, 
tum-taking activities such as rolling a car back and forth, and taking turns with a comb or 
hat. Verbal interactions were kept to a minimum.
The sessions lasted for 25 minutes each, and were videotaped to be analysed for three 
categories of behaviour (1) social interaction; (2) joint-attention; and (3) requesting 
behaviours. Social behaviour was defined as the child's capacity to elicit attention or
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physical contact and to engage in turn-taking with the experimenter. Joint-attention was 
seen to entail the use of gestures which were intended to direct attention to an object or 
event. Requesting behaviour was seen to entail the actions and gestures of the child which 
were intended to gain aid in obtaining objects and events. The joint-attention category 
included pointing, showing and also alternating looks between the particular toy and the 
experimenter's face.
A relative poverty of joint attention behaviours was reported only in the children with 
autism. For example, eye contact was relatively common during tickling, and relatively 
common when a toy was moved out of reach-but there was little of what Flobson (1993) 
calls 'referential looking' when both the child and the experimenter were engaged with a 
toy.
Hobson (1993) proposes further that this lack of joint attention to objects in children with 
autism represents the lack of an important relationship triangle which is necessary for a 
normally-developing symbolic life. In order to build concepts of the symbolic meaning of 
objects and events, one needs to be aware that one has 'l-Thou' relations with other 
people. One's symbols and language are, at least in part, socially-constructed. The 
'relatedness triangle' is primarily built from the relationship of the infant to the other, and 
secondarily from the relationship of both to the referent (the symbolic object or event). 
Thus, Hobson's theory predicts that a failure in interpersonal relatedness 'triangle 
formation' (infant-other-referent) can lead to impairments in symbolic and language 
abilities. This theory shall be further elaborated below.
A test of the prediction that linguistic ability depends upon adequate social interaction 
skills, is whether there is any relationship of joint-attention skills to the development of 
language in children with autism. If children with autism who are relatively able in 
language use (and the symbolic quality therein) are very poor in joint-attention skills, then 
the theoretical position that a relatedness triangle is crucial for both language and symbolic
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development is untenable. However, this is not to say that nonsymbolic elements of 
language (such as vocabulary) could not develop normally.
We have already seen that Loveland and Landry (1986) did note an association of the use 
of joint-attention gestures and language ability. Mundy et al. (1987) reported that with the 
sample of children with autism, individual subjects' abilities to comprehend and use 
protodeclarative gestures were correlated with measures of language ability and symbolic 
play.
In addition, Mundy et al. (1990) examined a group of fifteen children with autism (mean 
CA about 4 years) and equivalent groups of children with general intellectual delay and 
mainstreamed children. The study lasted a period of one year. In contrast with controls, 
the language development of the children with autism could be predicted by initial gestural 
non-verbal joint-attention skills, but not by initial language scores or IQ. Thus, there 
seems considerable evidence for both the importance of coordinated attention of children 
with autism themselves in the context of a dyad with another person, and for Hobson's 
postulate of a relatedness triangle which links affective experience to symbolic/linguistic 
ability.
Mundy, Sigman and colleagues identified key aspects of personal relatedness which are 
specifically delayed in autism - notably protodeclarative as opposed to protoimperative 
gestures, failure to respond toothers' bids for joint visual attention, certain specific forms 
of eye contact such as prolonged 'referential looking', and mutual gazing. These would 
seem to be convenient fora theory that autism involves social impairment first and 
symbolic impairment second.
However, Baron-Cohen ( 1993a) found that protodeclarative gestures were not impaired in 
autistic children when the pointing was made for reasons which were not purely social.
He argued that Hobson is wrong to assume that the impairment is social and therefore not
symbolic in the first instance (Baron-Cohen, 1993b), instead proposing that a symbolic 
impairment underlies the failure to engage in purely social protodeclarative pointing. 
Indeed, more recent work by Baron-Cohen ( 1993a, 1993b) has demonstrated that joint- 
attention impairments are compatible with a cognitive approach. At this point we are in 
danger of entering a key theoretical debate, before we have finished examining the 
impairments of autism. The theories of Hobson and Baron-Cohen will be further 
discussed below.
1.4.5 Empathy
It is developmental^ significant for an individual to recognise that the feeling of another 
individual is expressed through their emotional expressions. From this perception the 
child applies their own self-knowledge (e.g. the experience of pain) to the mental state of 
the other. Such empathy is an important element of interpersonal relations. A behavioural 
measure of this empathy might be the interpersonal co-ordination of affect.
Again, UCLA has been at the heart of research into empathic behaviours in autism. From 
structured tests of joint-attention Sigman, Mundy and Yirmiya (1990) assessed how 
relatively young children with autism (three to six years), and controls with general delay 
and no delay, express feeling towards the experimenter in 'joint-attention' and 
'requesting' conditions. The subjects had their facial expressions coded second-by- 
second for a total of eight minutes, using the Maximally Discriminative Movement Coding 
System (Izard, 1979).
The children with autism demonstrated uniformly low numbers of affect displays in both 
conditions, but least of all in the joint-attention condition. This was where mainstreamed 
controls smiled the most. A lack of affective sharing is apparent in autism on the basis of 
these results at least.
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Other studies corroborate this result. Snow, Hertzig and Shapiro (1987) analysed the 
interactions of ten children with autism, and ten children with general intellectual delay, in 
interaction situations. The situations were with (1) the child's mother, (2) a child 
psychiatrist, and (3) a nursery school teacher. Twenty 15-second excerpts of videotaped 
interaction were coded with each partner. Smiles and laughter were considered affective 
displays. Whereas most of the positive affect displayed by controls was other-directed, 
the children with autism tended to demonstrate rare, directionless displays of positive 
emotion. They seemed relatively self-absorbed. They showed selectively fewer other- 
directed smiles at the psychiatrist although there was a small but significant amount of 
other-directed affect displays towards the child's mother and the nursery school teacher.
More recently. Dawson, Hill, Spencer, Galpert and Watson (1990) examined 16 children 
with autism and 16 mainstreamed controls matched for receptive language age. There 
were three conditions: spontaneous free-play with a caregiver, a structured situation where 
the carer asked the child to aid him/her in putting away toys, and and a face-to-face 
encounter at which a snack was consumed. In line with Hobson's ( 1991b) concerns 
about the comparability of children with autism and children with no intellectual delay, it 
should be pointed out that there is some doubt about whether the results which follow 
represent autism-specific features.
However, with some caution in mind, the results can still be considered. Although the 
children with autism did not show fewer or shorter gazes at the experimenter's face, or 
fewer or shorter smiles during the snack, they were unlikely to combine their smiles with 
eye contact. Also, controls smiled in response to their mother's smile, whereas only three 
children with autism were recorded as doing so. Dawson et al.'s (1990) study is also 
interesting because it extended to the carer. Carers of children with autism were less likely 
than those of controls to smile in response to their child's smile. This suggests that the 
social impairments seen in autism extend beyond the child and into the behaviour of
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significant others. This perhaps explains why Kanner ( 1943) reported that parents of 
'autistic children' seemed aloof and detached.
Children with autism do not demonstrate coordinated emotion appropriate to interaction 
with another person. Also, carers of children with autism may not show affect in 
response to the affective displays of their children, because it is not accompanied by visual 
contact.
1.4.6 Emotional Expressiveness
The vocal and facial expression of emotion has also been examined in children with 
autism. Ricks ( 1975. 1979) made audio tape-recordings of six three- to four-year-old 
non-verbal children with autism, as well as six non-verbal children with general 
intellectual delay, and six normal infants, aged around eight to 11 months. Four situations 
involving emotional expressiveness were recorded: 'requesting' a meal at a hungry time; 
'frustration' elicited by withholding the food for a few moments; 'greeting' when the 
children first saw their mothers on waking, and 'pleased surprise' when the child was 
presented with a novel stimulus such as a balloon.
The carers of the children were presented with audio tape recordings of their own child, 
two other children of the same group, and a child from another group. For example, a 
carer of a child who had autism was asked ( 1 ) to identify the context of each vocalisation,
(2) to identify their own child, and (3) to identify the child who did not have autism.
Then, the carer was asked to discriminate their own child from the other six children with 
autism.
With normal infants, carers could easily understand the non-verbal message, but they 
could not discriminate their own child. Carers of children with autism could discriminate 
their own child, the contexts, and they could discriminate the child who did not have
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autism. They could not discriminate the contexts of the children with autism who were 
not their own. It seems from these results that the relationship of the child with autism 
and the carer is idiosyncratic in terms of vocal expressions of emotion.
The study of the facial expression of emotion in autism brings us once again to the UCLA 
group. Yirmiya, Kasari. Sigman and Mundy (1989) analysed excerpts of toy 
presentation, 'song and tickle' game play, tum-taking, and a balloon-blowing game. 
Children with autism, children with general intellectual delay, and mainstreamed children 
were included. Again, Izard's (1979) coding system for the facial expression of emotion 
was utilised.
The children with autism were more 'flat' or 'neutral' in their facial expressions of 
emotion than controls. Also, individual children with autism demonstrated a wide variety 
of emotions which were not displayed by any of the other children. Yirmiya et al. (1990) 
suggest that these expressions were inappropriate, incongruous to the expressions of the 
experimenter, and were often 'blended' curiously. For example, anger expressed with 
fear, or anger with joy.
Obviously, these comments could say more about the authors' experience of the children 
than the nature of the children's affect itself. However, the person who perceives the 
emotion is as much a part of interpersonal interaction as the the person displaying the
emotion.
Further evidence of the differential expression of facial emotion in children with autism 
and controls has been provided by MacDonald et al. (1989). In their study, judges were 
asked to rate the facial and vocal expressions of emotion in children with autism, and in 
controls, who had been specifically asked to display certain emotions. This required that 
the children be quite high-functioning. Expressions produced by children with autism 
were rated as more 'odd' than those of controls. Therefore, it seems that children with
autism are not perceived by others to demonstrate emotions 'normally'. One issue which 
will be taken up later in this thesis is whether there are within-subject differences in the 
perceived emotional state of children with autism as well as the between-group differences 
reported here.
Without knowing whether children were diagnosed 'autistic' or not, judges were able to 
identify the 'abnormality' of the expression of the children with autism. Nevertheless, 
Ricks' work demonstrates that at least to some extent, carers attempt to 'tune in' to the 
uniqueness of their own particular child. The development of autism would therefore 
seem to be 'dynamic' in the sense that there are developmental implications of having 
autism both for the child and for significant others.
1.4.7 Emotion Perception
Early work by Langdell (1978) had demonstrated that children with autism do not tend to 
recognise the faces of familiar peers by the upper regions of the face, unlike intellectually 
delayed controls and children in mainstreamed education. Instead they made more errors, 
and the younger autistic children tended to utilise the lower regions of the face. Langdell 
(1978) concluded that in autism, there may be an impairment in the perception of mouths 
and eyes which affects processing of emotional communication.
Following on from this original work, the perception of emotion by children with autism 
has been investigated by Hobson and colleagues (e.g. Weeks and Hobson, 1987:
Hobson, Ouston and l^e , 1988, 1989), as well as other authors (e.g. Fein, Lucci, 
Braverman and Waterhouse, 1992; Braverman, Fein, Lucci and Waterhouse, 1989; Prior, 
Oahlstrom and Squires, 1990). Hobson (1993) points out that differences between 
groups of children with autism and controls have often been quantitatively small, and 
occur less often when subjects arc matched for verbal abilities. This is not the case when 
subjects are matched for non-verbal intellectual level. Hobson (1991b) examines these
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problems at length. However, he maintains that methodological issues aside, children 
with autism often demonstrate poor perception of the emotions of other people, or at least 
do not attend to the emotions of others with the same salience as other children.
Perhaps the definitive study of the perception of emotion in children with autism is that 
conducted by Weeks and Hobson (1987). Fifteen children with autism were compared to 
an equal number of children without autism who had general intellectual delay, matched 
for verbal ability. The task involved sorting 16 photographs according to whether they 
matched presented 'standard' photographs. The standard photographs differed (1) by the 
sex of the person, (2) by the type of hat worn, and by (3) emotional expression. Whereas 
10 of the normal children sorted the photographs by the emotional expression of the 
person in the photograph before they sorted by the type of hat worn, only three of the 
children with autism did so. Nine of the children with autism sorted by the type of hat 
worn by the person in the photograph first, compared to five of the normal group. 
Furthermore, even when specifically instructed to sort by facial expression of emotion, 
only four of the nine children with autism who had not sorted by emotional expression 
spontaneously could sort at least 13 of the 16 cards correctly. All 15 of the controls had 
sorted by emotional expression without being told to do so.
Weeks and Hobson (1987) concluded that there is support for the hypothesis of poor 
perception of emotion in children with autism. This was not necessarily a matter of poor 
competence, since the majority of the children with autism could sort by emotional 
expression when specifically instructed to do so. This research seems to demonstrate that 
many children with autism are relatively inattentive and insensitive to emotional expression 
in others.
It is possible that children with autism may pass on test items requiring the discrimination 
of emotional stimuli by using 'non-emotional' perceptual or 'cognitive' strategies. In 
order to examine this possibility, Hobson, Ouston and lxe (1988) employed four
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'standard' photographs placed in a semicircle, which differed either by emotional 
expression or by the identity of the individual portrayed. Then the subject was presented 
with new photographs in sets of four. There were two tasks. First, in the 'emotional' 
task the subject had to sort the pictures of the different individuals by the equivalent 
emotional expression on the standard photograph. Second, in the 'identities' task the 
subject had to sort the sets of photos which were presented showing the same individuals 
as in the standard photos, by their identity. In this task photos showed a neutral affective 
tone.
To test for a 'non-emotional' perceptual strategy which may have been used by the 
children to answer correctly, the two tasks were repeated, but first the faces on the cards 
had blanked-out mouths, then they had blanked-out mouths and foreheads. In this way 
the authors hoped to partial-out any effects of perception by recognition of simple face 
changes, that is, perception not of emotional state but of emotional cue.
The groups scored equally in sorting the full faces of the different people according to 
emotional expression, and were equally capable of sorting the identity of the people in the 
photos. This seems to stand against the findings of Weeks and Hobson (1987).
However, in the 'identities' task the performance of the subjects declined with more facial 
features being blanked-out. The groups differed considerably in the 'emotions' task in 
this regard. The children with autism showed a more abrupt decline in performance. This 
suggests two things. First, abnormal emotion perception is a feature of autism. Second, 
children with autism may use non-emotional perceptual strategies to understand how to 
identify an emotional state, but not in an interpersonal, qualitative way which transcends 
the perception of individual facial features.
In a further twist to this study, another condition was included. The standard photos were 
presented upside-down, with the tasks the same as described above. The control subjects
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found it increasingly difficult to match emotions across identities, with the additional 
disruption to the normal processes of face recognition.
In the children with autism, performance was superior to that of the control group, in both 
types of matching, identity or emotion. Thus it seems clear that the normal processes of 
facial recognition are not used by children with autism. However, as Hobson (1993) 
points out, this may mean also that the identities task is an invalid control procedure.
As a post-script to these studies, Hobson, Ouston and I^ee (1989) allowed children with 
autism, children with intellectual delay, and mainstreamed children to 'free-rcspond' to 
sets of photos and sounds, some of which were 'emotional' faces and voices, some of 
which were 'non-emotional' objects and sounds used to serve as a control condition.
Once again, children with autism were poor at naming 'emotional' sets of photos and 
sounds, but were not poor at naming non-emotional sets of photos and sounds.
The theories which describe the impairments found in the research described above are not 
limited to the two presented here. However, there are strong reasons for contrasting these 
two theories. First, there is clear water between them. The metarepresentational approach 
includes a formulation of a basic symbolic impairment w hich (the authors would hope) 
accounts for the other social impairments which can be observed. In contrast, the 
interpersonal approach suggests that first comes interaction - all symbolic life is 
secondary. This issue is one of causation, and proof of causation of a particular factor has 
been very difficult to establish with certainty in autism.
Second, the theories represent two traditions in psychological research; the cognitive 
psychologists and the developmental psychopathologists influenced by psychoanalytic 
descriptions of development. It may be that there is more common ground to be found in 
the evidence, than the historical opposition of these movements would lead us to believe.
1.5 The Theories Explaining the Impairments of Autism. Specifically Symbolic Play
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1.6 Explaining the Social Impairments of Autism: The Metarepresentational Theory
The term "theory of mind" was first used by Premack and Woodruff (1978). They 
justified theirchoice of terms as follows:
"In saying that an individual has a theory of mind, we mean that the individual 
imputes mental states to himself and to others (either toconspecifics or to other 
species as well). A system of inferences of this kind is properly viewed as a theory, 
first, because such states are not directly observable, and second, because the 
system can be used to make predictions specifically about the behaviour of other 
organisms" (p.515)
Leslie (1987) suggests 'theory of mind' as the means by which children come to represent 
the mental world of others within their own subjective minds. He suggests that the ability 
to pretend is facilitated by a child's capacity for metarepresenlation. which is the 
mechanism by which 'symbols' of the environment are abstracted into thought (e.g. 
memory). Pretence allows the individual to imagine him/herself as another person, 
leading to an appreciation of mental states in others.
How does the metarepresentation mechanism work? There should first be some 
discussion of the nature of representation and metarepresentation. Leslie (1987) described 
the ability of the child to metarepresent as a watershed ability which appears early in 
childhood. This is a development which is derived from the person's ability to represent 
the environment perceptually. Perceptual representations are not sufficient for pretence, 
because they are faithful reproductions of the literal information which enters the senses.
I .eslie named these primary representations which cannot in themselves allow for the 
double knowledge required for pretence. By 'double knowledge' (McCune-Nicholich. 
1981) I am referring to the quality of pretence whereby the individual 'knows' that they 
are acting 'as-if something were true, even when they know it is not.
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In 1-eslie's model, representations must be 'quarantined' from primary representations for 
pretence to occur, because trying to act as if primary representations were not true would 
involve too much literal information for the individual to function. When this 
'quarantining' has occurred, the individual achieves metarepresentation; the separation of 
representations avoids contamination from primary, perceptual input. In saying a 
metarepresentation is 'decoupled'. I.eslie is saying that the pretend context is removing the 
person's behaviour from 'normal' input-output relations, i.e. there may be a behaviour 
which could not be predicted from environmental variables.
There are three basic types of metarepresentation in Leslie's model: ( I ) object substitution 
(deviant reference), (2) Attribution of properties (deviant truth) and (3) imaginary object 
production (deviant existence).
There are also three properties of mental Mate expression* which correspond to these 
pretences. Mental state expressions are terms such as believe, expect and want. The three 
properties are:
• referential opacity. One cannot infer other knowledge from the particular expression.
For example. 'Sarah-Jane believes John Major lives at No. 10 Downing Street' does not 
necessarily correspond to 'Sarah-Jane believes that the prime minister lives at No. 10 
Downing Street'.
• nonentailmcnt of truth. For example, 'John believes the cat is white' docs not 
necessarily correspond to the cat being in truth white.
• nonentailment of existence. For example, 'John believes the king of France is bald' 
docs not necessarily imply there is a king of France.
'Mental state expressions' are suggested to be key elements of the perceived notions of 
others' minds, I^eslie (1987) suggests that these properties of'mental state expressions' 
correspond to the basic types of pretence.
The communication and perception of mental state expressions are further suggested by 
I.eslie to be indicative of the existence of Theory of Mind', the generalised notion of a 
person's knowledge of the mental states in others. Leslie contends that pretence is..
'..actually a primitive manifestation of the child's theory of mind and requires 
mastery of exactly the same logical structures as understanding mental states.' (cited 
in Wimpory and Chadwick, personal communication)
Leslie (1987) asserts that pretence may be regarded as an information-processing activity 
which occurs in real-time. Also, it is suggested that the capacity for metarepresentation is 
observed relatively early, at around 18 months. However, since this seminal paper 
important refinements have been made to this theory.
Josef Pemer (1991) suggests that 'primary' representations of the world are single, 
constantly updating models of objects and events. The child must transform primary 
representations into secondary representations, this becoming possible around 11 months. 
These secondary representations involve multiple models of the world: that which the 
child perceives, and that which the child infers, which may be beyond direct perception.
It should be noted that Pemer (1991) calls this 'Acting-as-if rather than 
metarepresentation or symbolic ability (which he describes as a later ability, appearing at 
about 4 years). For example, the child will infer that a toy is underneath a cloth when s/he 
watches it being hidden. Ixslie's interpretation is that this involves the child 
meiarepresentinff the object: Pemer's is that the child acts-as-if the object can still be seen. 
The difference is that the child does not explicitly understand the alternative
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representations, which is why the preschool child may make a number of failures in terms 
of certain tasks which seem easy to the adult observer. For example, the child may often 
fail to infer when another individual has a belief which needs updating (in step with 
changes in the situation) in order to be true, or that a hidden photograph will become out 
of date when the scene changes.
From Leslie's model, abilities of pretence should predict 'theory of mind' ability. The key 
theory of mind' exponents suggest that autism is a failure of these individuals to 
metarepresent (Baron-Cohen. 1988, 1989a, 1989b, 1991; Leslie and Frith, 1990; Leslie, 
1987, 1988). A cognitive deficit model of autism, based on Leslie's model of 
representation and metarepresentation, involves the idea that the child who has autism 
cannot decouple metarepresentations from primary representations. Representations do 
not become divorced from the literal representations into metarepresentations, and so the 
child cannot develop the 'dualistic' concept of potential play objects. As a result, the 
child's symbolic play is impaired, whereas their non-symbolic play is relatively 
unimpaired. Manipulative play does not involve any metarepresentation; that is, the play 
is consistent with the physical attributes of the object. Similarly, Junctional play can be 
identified as a separate category of play, which does not require metarepresentation except 
in terms of perceiving a miniature object as representative of a bigger object. An example 
of this is the toy car being pushed along the carpet.
Autistic children seem to lack an understanding of mental states in others and show limited 
symbolic play, as we have seen. Pemer's theory, coherently presented in Understanding 
the Representational Mind(1991), does not require any necessary link between symbolic 
play and understanding of mental states in others. Baron-Cohen (1987) found that only 
20% of children with autism would engage in spontaneous symbolic play. Similar 
consistent results have been found in studies of false-belief understanding in children with 
autism. This would seem to favour Leslie's (1987) thesis to Pemer's (1991) thesis.
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However, as we have seen in the symbolic play research, more symbolic play can be 
elicited or instructed or modelled in autistic children, although it has not been 
demonstrated that performance on theory of mind tests improves in this way. Perner
(1993) believes we should rethink the metarepresentational theory because of this. His 
objections shall be examined in detail below.
1.6.1 How does the 'Theory of Mind' Approach Account for Symbolic Play?
In Leslie's (1987) theory, symbolic play is simply an early behavioural manifestation of 
metarepresentational ability. It is dependent upon the biological integrity of the brain, and 
not dependent on interpersonal interaction in order to develop. Although within this 
theory different metarepresentations might be expected to be learned in their socio- 
emotional contexts, a cognitive structure capable of processing information in symbolic 
ways is innately specified.
Frith (1992) conceptualises autism (and dyslexia) as a cognitive deficit in the mind caused 
by a biological deficit in the brain. Frith suggests that there might be several root 
biological causes of autism, but brain abnormalities are narrowed into a common pathway, 
and form a cognitive deficit (poor metarepresentation), resulting in the core difficulties of 
poor socialisation, communication and imagination. Poor symbolic play behaviours are 
representative of the poor imagination coming directly from the cognitive deficit. What 
evidence exists for the presence of an identifiable biological deficit in the brain?
For some time, it was thought that autism must involve some type of left-hemisphere 
dysfunction, because autism was conceptualised as a disorder of communication (Rutter, 
1978; McCann, 1981; Prior, 1979; Ricks and Wing, 1976). More recently, reviews such 
as that of Fein, Lucci, Kaplan and Waterhouse (1984) and Bishop (1993) have suggested 
that "we are still a very long way off from understanding how brain damage or 
dysfunction can cause such a distinctive pattern of symptoms” (Bishop, 1993, p.279).
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Damasio and Maurer (1978) suggested that autism is a disorder of the mesolimbic system 
and associated frontal lobe areas. This has not been confirmed or refuted since limbic 
structures project into many neocortical areas of the brain. The manyfold functions of 
limbic structures defy neurological understanding by way of their great complexity. This 
possibility aside, there is little agreement as to how abnormalities identified in children 
with autism relate to the evidence of cognitive and emotional impairments in autism (for 
reviews of the evidence in MR1 and CT studies, see Coleman and Gillberg, 1985; Reichler 
and Lee, 1987). One area of research which does show some consistency despite being a 
theory in infancy is the study of the neocerebellum conducted by Eric Courchesne (e.g. 
1991). This will be discussed later as it has more significance for the second major theory 
reviewed in this thesis.
There is strong empirical evidence for some degree of 'cognitive' disorder in autism 
However there has been, until recently, a lack of consistent evidence from neurobiological 
studies that cognitive dysfunction in autism has a basis in brain damage (although it might 
be suggested that neurotransmitter depletion or developmental cortical malformations are 
responsible; Bishop, 1993).
Recently, Baron-Cohen (1994) has suggested that a three-node circuit exists between the 
superior temporal sulcus, the orbito-frontal cortex, and the amygdala. He writes that there 
is evidence of a SAM (Shared-Attention-Mechanism) which is faulty in autism, as well as 
aToMM (Theory of Mind Mechanism) and an EDD (Eye Direction Detector). Any 
breakage in the circuit can result in autism according to his theory. Baron-Cohen (1994) 
also mentions a fourth component, the ID (Intentional ity Detector) but the location of this 
component in the theoretical system is as yet unspecified.
Baron-Cohen's Model o f the Mindreadinn System is certainly plausible. In support of the 
model, Baron-Cohen et al. (1994) have examined the pattern of brain activity shown by
37
12 adult volunteers during recognition of mental state terms in a word list, using Single 
Photon Emission Computerised Tomography (SPECT). They found that there was 
increased cerebral blood flow during the mental state recognition task in the right orbito- 
frontal cortex, relative to the left orbito-frontal region. The authors concluded that in their 
view the right orbito-frontal cortex corresponds directly to the ToMM. As yet there is no 
study of autistic people to test if the pattern of brain activity is any different for these 
individuals.
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1.7 Hxplaining the Social Impairments of Autism: The Interpersonal Relatedness Theory
For more than a decade R.P. Hobson has examined the possibility that children with 
autism demonstrate different social behaviours to individuals who do not have autism 
(Hobson, 1982. 1984, 1989a. 1989b, 1990a. 1990b. 1990c. 1991a. 1991b. 1991c,
1993; Weeks and Hobson. 1987; Hobson. Ouston and Lee. 1988. 1989). The concept of 
interpersonal relatedness is proposed to be ( I ) the level of analysis by which we may most 
adequately make sense of autism and (2) as encapsulating at once the cognitive and 
emotional (and conative and perceptual) nature of symbolic abilities and the ability to infer 
the mental states of others.
Hobson is not a social determinist and states explicitly in his 1991(a) paper Against the 
Theory o f "Theory o f Mind" that there is a biological basis for interpersonal relatedness. 
However, children come to know that other people have minds through the knowledge 
gained in experiencing interpersonal relations. Also, the use of imaginative role-taking is 
very important in interpersonal understanding. To apply such imaginative role-taking to 
an object rather than another person is one way of conceptualising symbolic play as a 
social capacity. Therefore this theory suggests the reverse of i^eslie's (1987) theory. 
Interpersonal understanding leads to symbolic ability (pretence) rather than vice versa.
The interpersonal relatedness 'common denominator' serves the function of representing, 
in a single concept, the early dynamics of interactions with caregivers, as opposed to a 
theory of interperspnal dynamics which artificially divides the cognitive, the perceptual, 
the conativc. or the emotional.
Hobson (1993) suggests that both our symbolic life and our knowledge of other people's 
mental states requires an affective engagement with other people. Innate propensities to 
engage others must be present, but so too must the interaction. As Hobson himself states, 
"innate mechanisms operate to yield interpersonally-coordinated attitudes between an
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infant and others” (Hobson, 1993, p. 156). These coordinated attitudes are "needed for an 
infant to develop creative symbolic functioning".
Hobson’s approach answers the criticisms of Kanner's (1943) suggestion that viewing the 
lack of affective contact as the basis of autism could not predict linguistic and cognitive 
abnormalities (Rutter, 1983). Hobson proposes that the emotional 'give and take' of 
language is not present in autism. He points out that children with autism are relatively 
unimpaired in using abstractions which do not require interpersonal understanding 
(Hobson and Lee, 1989). In claiming that language is actually based in the joint co­
ordination of attitudes between infant and caregiver, Hobson's approach offers a causal 
route from  a lack of affective contact between persons to inappropriate use of language 
and more general socio-cognitive problems (e.g. capacity for self-reflection, deception).
The radical nature of this approach is important. If it is correct, then autism is a 
phenomenon where the intellectual and the social causes merge (Wing and Gould's 1979 
survey would support this). More than this, the development of language, self, symbol, 
indeed the very development of mind are at once inseparably social/emotional and 
intellectual/cognitive.
Here, then is a theory which proposes that primary intersubjectivity (interpersonal 
relations) will lead to secondary intersubjectivity (self-knowledge, language, symbolic 
ability). Hobson seems wary of wasteful debates about whether autism is primarily 
'cognitive', 'affective' or 'conative'. Indeed it is highly possible that autism only exists 
exclusively in one or other of these domains in the mind of the theorist.
Where Hobson (1993) feels there is evidence fora split in the development of mind, is 
between 'I-Thou' relationships which occur between a subject and other subjects, and 'I- 
lt' relationships between a subject and objects. Hobson suggests that people with autism 
are aware that they exist in a world of manipulable objects but are relatively unaware that
40
they exist in a world of 'persons'. In this theory, 'persons' are seen to be something 
which the infant learns very early to regard as 'special'. Accordingly, symbolic play 
should reflect the relationships of the subject to significant others in their lives. This is, as 
Hobson (1993) notes about his theory generally, in tune with the object-relations school 
of psychoanalysis.
Hobson states explicitly (1991a) that it is mistaken to regard the developing child as a 
'theorist'. Children, he argues, do not demonstrate a system of inferences in their 
behaviour. They do not show discrete hypothesis testing which leads to falsification or 
support for their 'theories of mind'. If the theory is implicit, that is, not requiring 
falsification to support or reject the inferences made, then perhaps a more appropriate term 
than 'theory' is required. To borrow from psychoanalysis, for example, "I project that 
you have mind" may sum up more accurately how understanding the mind of another 
person is rooted in one's own experience, not in the gradual refinement of'theory of 
mind' by a miniature scientist carrying out systematic theory of mind tests.
1.7.1 How does "Interpersonal Relatedness" Theory Account for Symbolic Play?
According to this theory, symbolic functioning has interpersonal origins. "Primary 
intersubjectivity" entails the one-year-old's emerging patterns of affective person-to- 
person sharing which one might conceptualise as 'being aware that one lives in a world of 
persons'. At one year, however, the child becomes aware that objects (and events) which 
are not other 'persons' can be shared with others. Importantly, the individual now 
becomes poised to show relatedness towards others, the world of objects and the self.
The interpersonal relatedness theory of symbolic development can be expressed in terms 
of a'relatedness triangle'. Figure 1.1 demonstrates.
Figure 1.1
Infant------------- ► Referent (e.g. symbol)
Note the important element of this triangle that the infant perceives the attitude of the other 
and also the directedness of this attitude. An altitude is to be considered here the mental 
position of a person towards a symbolic referent or other person. Central to the infant's 
comprehension of others' attitudes is her perception of the directedness of gaze and 
emotional state of these others.
The child understands the directed, functional nature of having attitudes-towards-objects- 
in the-world. This is the point of'showing' behaviours in one-year-old infants. They 
wish to align and coordinate a joint-attention to an object. This is the theoretical link of 
Hobson's work and that of Mundy, Sigman and colleagues at UCLA. Why show things 
to other people, if there is no perception that both people have attitudes to the object in 
question? Joint attention directly represents interpersonal relatedness.
This argument touches not only on cognitive capacities to perceive relatedness and 
symbolic referents, and the affective nature of relatedness. It also requires some attention 
to the conative elements of children's early development. One has to want to engage in a 
relatedness triangle. This is important for the current thesis. It means that if one wishes 
to examine the cognitive and affective nature of a symbolic function (such as symbolic 
play), it requires some control of conative factors. This will be taken on board in the 
empirical studies of this thesis.
Other
We have a picture of an infant who assumes psychological attitudes not only to other 
individuals, but also to objects which either the infant can have psychological attitudes 
towards, or another person can have attitudes towards. The attitudes of the infant and of 
the other may differ, but are coordinated in the relatedness triangle.
For this level of awareness to develop, interpersonal relatedness theory requires the infant 
to be already influencing the actions of others. This can indeed be seen in such 
behaviours as requesting. This means that pre-verbal communication may actually be a 
prerequisite for the development of the relatedness triangle (see Christie, Newson,
Newson and Prevezer, 1992; Wimpory and Chadwick, personal communication).
With the relatedness triangle in place, independent symbolic abilities are due to the 
'intériorisation' of the configuration of interpersonal events. First, infants distinguish 
attitudes from things at which attitudes are directed. Second, infants realise their own 
potential for assuming another person's attitude towards an object. Third, the infant is 
now placed to discover that given, interpersonally-negotiated 'meanings' can be assigned 
to symbols which serve to 'carry' the meanings. New realms of abstract communication 
and what we might call 'intellect' now open up before the young child.
It is not the case that only one relatedness triangle exists (infant-carer-referent). Nor is it 
the case that any one triangle is as simple as the prototype represented in Figure 1.1. For 
example, by using the referent as a 'pivot', the child can perceive that several others can 
have similar or different attitudes towards the same referent. Or alternatively, the child can 
perceive that a range of referents are perceived by the other. Figures 1.2 and 1.3 illustrate 
the respective variations.
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Others
Figure 1.3
Other
Referents
Furthermore, Flobson (1993) demonstrates that the 'relatedness triangle' allows the child 
to 'move into' the psychological position of the other (Figure 1.4). If the infant is this 
capable, it is but a short step to conceptualising her or his own mind as a special case in 
moving into the psychological position of the other. If this is indeed the method by which 
children become self-aware, then one might expect a dissociation of first-person feelings 
and objective self-knowledge. Gopnik (1993) presents an interesting discussion of this 
issue in which she favours such a dissociation. For current purposes, it is sufficient to 
state that the relatedness triangle unifes symbolic development and development of the 
awareness of others' mental states.
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Figure 1.4
Other Infant(s)
Infant Referent (e.g. symbol) Infant -------—► RefeR ferenti s)
Flobson (1993) argues that the relatedness triangle is essential for symbolic development.
shifts in perspective occurring through identification with others' attitudes or potential for 
particular attitudes. We have arrived at a key difference between this account of symbolic 
development and that of Leslie (1987).
This theory implies that symbolic abilities must arise through experience of interpersonal 
affective relations with others, specifically through identification with projected attitudes 
attributed to these others. Leslie (1987) defines knowledge of mental states, or as he calls 
it "theory of mind", as arising from an innate capacity for metarepresentation. The 
causality of the two theories in this regard are the inverse of one another. The 
interpersonal relatedness approach suggests that symbolic play is the product of attributing 
a suspended 'for-serious' attitude to the symbolic object (e.g teddy is not alive) whilst at 
the same time attributing a 'not-for-serious' attitude to the object. The child can adopt 
both attitudes at will. McCune-Nicholich (1981) calls this 'double knowledge'. Only 
through experience of 'others-with-attitudes' can this occur, according to this theory.
"An interpersonal process is transformed into an intrapersonal one. Lvery function 
in the child's cultural development appears twice; first, on the social level, and later 
on the individual level; first, between people Unterpsycholo^ical) and then inside the 
child (intrapsycholoffical). This applies equally to voluntary attention, to logical 
memory, and to the formation of concepts. All the higher functions originate as 
actual relations between human beings" (Vygotsky, 1978, quoted in Hobson. 1993, 
p. 131; Vygotsky's italics)
He states that the mechanism by which infants come to symbolise is through insights into
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Now that the theoretical account of symbolic play has been clarified, is there any 
neurological evidence to suggest that the relatedness of autistic people is disturbed? 
Recently, Eric Courchesne has suggested that the cerebellum, specifically the 
neocerebellum, may have been wrongly assumed to be restricted to motor functioning 
(Courchesne. 1991; Akshoomoff and Courchesne, 1992). His radical suggestion is that 
the neocerebellum, phylogenetically the newest part of the cerebellum, may be important 
in the voluntary shift in selective attention between the sensory modalities. This part of 
the brain has connections to the pulvinar, and the superior colliculus. There are also 
connections to the parietal and frontal cortices, areas which are traditionally associated 
w ith executive functions.
Akshoomoff and Courchesne (1992) examined the function of the neocerebellum in six 
patients with cerebellar damage and in 13 controls. Two experiments were described. In 
the first, subjects were required to rapidly shift their mental focus of attention between 
auditory and visual stimuli. In the second, subjects were required to continuously 
maintain a focus of attention. In the first experiment performance in shifting between 
modalities (accuracy) when targets were presented rapidly and with little time in between, 
was compared to performance when they were presented less rapidly.
The subjects demonstrated similar performance in the focus of attention experiment. 
However, subjects with cerebellar damage performed poorly when required to shift 
rapidly between vision and audition. The authors suggest that the neocerebellum should 
be assigned a new role in cognitive operations; the facilitation of rapid and accurate shifts 
of attention.
I he authors further suggest that autism may be a disorder of foetal or infantile 
neocerebellar dysplasia (disordered development of the neural tissue). Courchesne et al.
(1994) have demonstrated that this feature can be identified by magnetic resonance
imaging in people with autism, irrespective of their general intellectual level. These 
findings may be integrated with Hobson’s view that interpersonal relatedness in autism is 
interrupted: it is probable that difficulties experienced by the infant in changing the focus 
of attention between vision and audition will have profound social implications for the 
development of affective co-ordination.
Of the recent neuroanatomic studies reviewed by Courchesne (1991), five out of five 
autopsy studies and nine out of 12 neuroimaging studies report cerebellar abnormalities. 
Courchesne feels that this disparity may reflect restrictions in neuroimaging technology. 
Autopsy studies enjoy the advantage of microscopic analysis of brain tissue.
Of I 1 neuroimaging and four autopsy studies examining the cerebral hemispheres, 
thalamus, basal ganglia, and lateral/third ventricles, no consistent results have emerged. 
Courchesne (1991) reports that one autopsy study out of four has found evidence for 
enlargement of the third ventricle in autism (Jacobson, Le Couteur, Howlin and Rutter, 
1988). Also, two autopsy studies found evidence for limbic abnormality (Bauman, 1991; 
Bauman and Kemper, 1985).
The relative consistency of the findings regarding the cerebellum seem specific to the 
neocerebellum, since many people with autism seem to have intact anterior paleocerebellar 
structures. Courchesne (1991) also reports that the brainstem and fourth 
ventricle/cerebellar cisterns may be abnormal, but the evidence is inconsistent.
"The cerebellum is the only anatomical structure for which there is both imaging and 
autopsy evidence of abnormality based on data gathered by many laboratories.” 
(Courchesne. 1991, p.788)
What does this mean for interpersonal relatedness? Infants become disturbed or 
disinterested when their carers do not interact with them in real-time, and cerebellar
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dysplasia could be responsible for a disruption of normal interaction. Consider the study 
of Murray and Trevarthen (1985). Two- and three-month-old infants were sat in front of 
a television monitor, on which was shown the mother's 'live' face looking towards the 
infant. The mother herself could see the infant via a monitor. Through this setup, a 
surprisingly 'fluent' interpersonal engagement was achieved. When the children were 
played their mother's face with a 30-second delay between her behaviour and the infant 
seeing the playback, the infants became distressed and/or looked away, momentarily 
glancing back at the screen.
If such a 'perturbation' was to be caused not by external events, but by neocerebellar 
damage interfering with the perception of social events, Courchesne may have discovered 
the neurobiological basis of poor interpersonal relatedness between children with autism 
and others. It certainly seems that real-time synchrony of interpersonal behaviour is 
required for satisfactory relating. Add to this Hobson's view that symbolic, self-reflective 
and linguistic abilities require such relatedness and the potential implications of 
Courchesne's work become apparent.
Are there any other ways in which the theory can be tested? If poor relatedness is indeed 
at the core of autism, then improving relatedness should theoretically reduce 'autistic' 
symptoms. Wimpory and Chadwick (personal communication) have demonstrated that 
the interactive behaviours of therapists can be crucial to outcome in children with autism. 
Using musical instruments as communicative tools, the authors describe how by 
'slowing' interaction to the child's pace (e.g. by banging a drum and waiting for the child 
to do the same) and building more complex interactions on top of basic turn-taking, much 
progress is possible.
I he authors describe a case study where three outcome measures were recorded at three- 
week intervals. The conditions were; free play with toys, free play with an adult, and free 
play with both toys and an adult. The outcome measures were; eye contacts, initiations of
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interaction made by the child, and the number of times the child changed the rules of a 
game between the child and the adult. These measures were assumed to represent three 
identifiable areas of impairment in autism; affective contact, communication, and 
rigidity / obsessions in thought.
The results were startling. The number of eye contacts increased dramatically across the 
intervention period, relative to a baseline period, as did the number of initiations of 
interaction made by the child (in this case from 20% to 75%). Furthermore, four of the 
seven intervention sessions demonstrated at least one rule change made by the child in the 
course of the interaction. On one occasion four rule-changes were made by the child.
This compares to no rule changes made during any of the six baseline sessions.
Wimpory (1992) has followed-up this case and demonstrated that the effects of the 
intervention were not transient. Although this is only a single case, Wimpory and 
Chadwick (personal communication) suggest that intervention such as their therapeutic 
approach..
"..parallels the interactive patterns of mothers with their infants in that both involve 
the development of shared understandings through familiar play routines.”
Let us make explicit the direction of this argument. Wimpory and Chadwick suggest that 
neurocerebellar abnormality such as that identified by Courchesne (e.g 1991 )can account 
for a breakdown in the interactions which are crucial to the development of social agency, 
or what Flobson might describe as an awareness of being a person amongst persons-with- 
minds.
I his is the tenuous speculation; that this therapy demonstrates that cerebellar, specifically 
neocerebellar abnormality may underlie failed interpersonal relations in autism, but that 
through intervention, some compensation is possible. If true, this supports Hobson's
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theory of autism over the 'theory of mind' approach because an innate capacity for 
metarepresentation which is specifically damaged should not be amenable to improvement 
through modification of interaction. Yet Wimpory and Chadwick demonstrate that at least 
in the case of one child with autism, measured variables of social and communicative 
skills showed improvement.
It is interesting that Courchesne et al. (1994) and Courchesne (1991) suggested that 
neocerebellar damage is a feature of children with autism irrespective of general intellectual 
delay. Akshoomoff and Courchesne (1992) suggested that the neocerebellum has 'a new 
role in cognitive operations', that of coordinating rapid shifts in attention between vision 
and audition. As a further test of the interpersonal theory, one might expect that other 
disorders where interpersonal co-ordination is interrupted perceptually would show 
features in common with autism.
Hobson (1993) suggests that the disorder of congenital blindness may provide some 
evidence of the centrality of perceiving persons in the development of social and linguistic 
skills. For example, Fraiberg and Adelson (1977) describe three congenitally-blind 
children with no general intellectual delay whose symbolic play was delayed until after 
they were three years old.
One of these children, Kathie, Hobson (1993) describes in some detail. She "could not 
represent herself through a doll or a toy. She could not create or invent a situation in play. 
She could not attend to a story or answer questions regarding a story or tell a story 
herself." (Fraiberg and Adelson, 1977, p.256) At the age of three years, Kathie could not 
pretend playdough was a cookie. However, by four years old Kathie could represent 
herself in play, and could use personal pronouns correctly. By six. she was socially and 
linguistically accomplished, inventive in play, deceptive, and socially independent. That 
is. Kathie could not have had autism to demonstrate such a full compensation of her 
delays.
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The interpersonal relatedness argument explains the occurrence of such symptoms in 
children with congenital blindness. These children have to compensate through other 
senses for poor access to visual information that they are 'persons among persons-with- 
attitudes'. Hobson (1993) argues that symbolic play, 'sharing' of experiences, echolalia. 
and personal pronoun use are all found to be delayed in blind children. However, most of 
these problems have been fully compensated at seven years.
In terms of the 'relatedness triangle' we 'see' the intentionality of the visually-portrayed 
attitudes of others. Blind children obviously cannot do this. However. Hobson (1993) 
seems unaware of Courchesne's (1991) results. These areas of research could potentially 
cross-pollinate to yield a developmental model of autism which links brain function to the 
importance of interpersonal perception and co-ordination of attitudes.
1.8 Uncomfortable Evidence for the Metarepresentational Theory
There is some evidence which does not wholly support the metarepresentational theory. 
We have seen that there is some evidence for a reduction in autistic symptoms via 
communication therapy. We have also seen that some children with severe perceptual 
impairments can demonstrate autistic features. Because these impairments dissipated over 
time (i.e. the children were not autistic) it is not logical that a basic symbol impairment 
was responsible. Hobson (1993) suggests that this might indicate that relatedness leads to 
symbolic life and not vice versa.
Another point is that the level of symbolic play shown by autistic children is higher in 
situations where more structure is provided to the child (Lewis and Boucher, 1988:
Jarrold, 1992, personal communication; Sigman and Ungerer, 1984). A basic symbol 
impairment is not supported by these findings, because (1) cognitive deficit or delay 
implies that no improvement can be shown by simply rearranging the situation -
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improvements, if they occur at all, should be gradual and developmental - and also, (2) 
because knowledge of mental states in autistic people cannot be improved in this way.
The second point is particularly difficult for Leslie's (1987) thesis. However. Pemer 
(1993, 1991) has proposed a metarepresentational model which takes account of the 
disparity between latent symbolic ability and theory of mind in autistic people.
One plausible objection to the theory of mind concept has been that since autistic children 
show less desire for peer interaction, that all their social knowledge is impaired (Hobson, 
1992). In fact, Baron-Cohen ( 1993b) contended that knowledge about mental states is 
specifically impaired. The hypothesis that knowledge of the social world in general is 
impaired can be discounted with some certainty.
1.9 Uncomfortable Evidence for the Interpersonal Relatedness Theory
There has been some difficulty with the idea that children with autism are poor social 
perceivers. Although Hobson et al. (1980) did find differences in the strategies used by 
autistic children to perceive emotions, their results did not directly replicate the findings of 
Weeks and Hobson (1987). Given that Hobson (1986) was clear that emotion perception 
should be a salient feature of autism, conflicting results such as these should not occur. 
However, the criticism levelled by Baron-Cohen ( 1993b) that emotion perception 
impairments are not apparent when controls are matched for verbal ability is perhaps 
unwarranted, because autistic people often demonstrate verbal ability which does not 
reflect their non-verbal intellect.
Nevertheless, there is a contrast between the conflicting evidence of the emotion 
perception studies and the clear evidence for theory of mind impairments. This point is 
particularly difficult for Hobson's theory.
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In addition. Baron-C'ohen (1994; also Baron-Cohen et al., 1994) has coherently accounted 
for joint-attention impairments which had previously been held to predate mental state 
understanding. Whilst it might still be held that full understanding of mental states only 
emerges at about four years. Baron-Cohen proposes the existence of three 
metarepresentational parallel processing units, these being: the Shared Attention 
Mechanism (SAM), which is responsible for the interpersonal coordination eye contact; 
the Theory of Mind Mechanism (ToMM) which is separately and distinctly resonsible for 
understanding others' minds, and the Eye Direction Detector (EDD), which he proposes to 
be responsible for expanding eye contact to other objects.
Since the SAM exists in parallel with the ToMM and the EDD, this allows the cognitive 
theory to incorporate the findings of joint-attention studies. In this theory, one could be 
damaged before the others are due to mature - as seen in joint-attention studies with very 
young autistic children - but all will be damaged because the underlying 
metarepresentational basis of all three is the root of the autistic symptoms. Hobson's 
contention is that interpersonal relatedness is the only conceptual common denominator 
(Hobson, 1993) which allows us to fully understand autism, but one would doubt that 
Baron-Cohen accepts this. In his theory (Baron-Cohen, 1994) the functions of the SAM, 
ToMM and the EDD are possibly anatomically, but certainly functionally distinct despite 
all being 'metarepresentational'. Clearly, Hobson (1993) does not feel that features of 
interpersonal relatedness should be considered in this way, lest the true indivisible nature 
of interpersonal understanding (as he would see it) is lost.
1.10 Brief Introduction to Alternative Theories
Recently, Pemer (1993) has outlined his alternative theory of metarepresentational and 
symbolic play. His first point is that the term 'metarepresentation' implies representing 
about representing. However, symbolic play does not entail representing about 
representing. "Theory of mind" ability does entail representing about representing.
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Pemer's definition of metarepresentation does not suggest the 'decoupling' of primary 
perceptual representations leads directly to a metarepresentation. This is his second point. 
People with autism are more metarepresentation-impaired (e.g. in false belief 
understanding) than decoupling-impaired (e.g in symbolic play).
Pemer (1993) challenges the very notion of a 'decoupling mechanism'. He suggests that 
children with autism may lack a 'database' of social information which they would need to 
'build' a 'theory of mind’. Pemer (1993) acknowledges Courchesne (1991), suggesting 
an impairment in co-ordinating perception of social information.
Pemer's theory is a modification of Leslie’s (1987) thesis which is more consistent with 
ev idence from studies of symbolic play. It retains a cognitive nature and does not address 
an affective level of analysis as such.
Tantam (1992) attempted to characterise the fundamental social handicap in autism. His 
view was that an early developmental process was responsible for later affective and 
theory of mind impairments - the social gaze response. This was the inherent tendency of 
the normal infant to focus gaze and attention on social gaz.e, and later on the objects in the 
environment as indicated by the gesture of others. Tantam (1992) argues that this 
response accounts even for theory of mind.
Certainly there are many clinical accounts of bizarre eye gaze in people with autism, and at 
the very least eye gaze is not used with great social skill. The importance of Tantam's 
contribution is seen in Baron-Cohen's (1994) model of the mindreading system, which 
does not incorporate social gaze into the ToMM - instead the SAM is proposed. This is 
partly because the theory of mind theory could not account retrospectively for impairments 
seen before two years of age. Therefore Tantam (1992) has proposed an important 
alternative theory which may have influenced the theory of mind research programme.
54
A further alternative theory was summarised in Rogers and Pennington (1991). They 
suggest that early social capacities involving imitation, emotion sharing, and theory of 
mind are primarily and specifically impaired in autism. Further, they suggest that these 
three capacities involve forming and coordinating social representations of the self and 
other at increasing levels of complexity via representational processes that extract patterns 
of similarity between the self and the other. This work is in some ways an extension of 
Stem’s (1985) theory of interpersonal development. However, it also proposes a 
neuropsychological model of interpersonal co-ordination involving prefrontal and 
executive function capacities consistent with the social impairments of autism.
Unlike Tantam's (1992) theory, Rogers and Pennington (1991) suggest more than one 
basic factor underlying autism. At present, it remains difficult to choose between theories, 
because evidence of specific impairments in autism does not necessarily imply causation. 
As Hobson (1993) remarks, this problem is quite general for the builder of theories of
autism.
1.11 Aims
There are several ways in which we can add to the present evidence. First, we can ask 
whether symbolic play can be influenced by the presence of different environmental 
conditions. Second, we can examine affective and attentional factors in the symbolic play 
situation, with a view to comparison between autistic and non-autistic children. Third, we 
can seek to replicate the suggestion made by Lewis and Boucher (1995) that only 
spontaneous and elicited symbolic play are impaired in autism. Finally, we can examine 
referential looking' in a symbolic play situation - how different is this in children with 
autism?
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• Can a social stimulus influence symbolic play - and is this different in autism?
(a strong effect suggests that we might have to modify metarepresentationa! theory 
towards a broader concept, possibly Hobson's)
• Do certain affecti ve/attentive variables relate to symbolic play differently in children with 
autism and children without autism?
(again we might have to broaden our model o f symbolic play to include other factors)
• Are specific kinds of non-spontaneous symbolic play impaired in autism (e.g. play 
which requires the child to produce the symbolic idea)?
(is general ivitv impaired in autism rather than symbolic ability per se?) •
• Is there therefore less 'referential looking' from the child to the experimenter in children 
with autism than in controls, in a symbolic play situation? (Is a symbolic play situation, in 
which an experimenter takes part, a relatedness triangle?)
So to recap, the empirical studies of this thesis shall ask the following questions:
Chapter 2
The Presence of a Musical Stimulus and the Symbolic Play of Pre­
school Children
2.1 Introduction
The purpose of this introductory study was to examine whether a stimulus which 
has a social or affective meaning could influence the symbolic play of young 
children. In Chapter I. it was seen that metarepresentation is proposed by l^slie 
( 1987) as an innate ability which is manifest in symbolic play. This study was 
designed to establish whether metarepresentational behaviour enjoys independence 
from social-affective stimuli.
It was necessary to incorporate two things in the experimental design of this study. 
First, it was necessary to construct a structured symbolic play test. This test 
included elicited, instructed and modelled components. This was intended to 
maximise the symbolic play demonstrated by the participants. The lesson of 
structuring the symbolic play test was taken from such studies as that by Sigman 
and Ungerer ( 1984) and I^wis and Boucher ( 1988, 1995). As well as the 
maximisation of symbolic play, structuring the test also has the advantage of 
reducing the influence of conative factors (e.g. a lack of motivation to play 
symbolically).
The second necessary feature of this study was an appropriate stimulus which can 
reasonably be expected to potentially influence the behaviour of young children. 
Instrumental music was chosen as the external stimulus which was hypothesised to 
influence symbolic play. Symbolic communication (language) is associated with 
left-hemisphere function, whereas affective processes, and spontaneous expressive
non-verbal communication, are associated with the right hemisphere (Buck. 1984). 
The perception of music tends to be associated with right-hemispheric activity, at 
least in right-handed individuals (Bryden and Ley. 1983). So there is a 
concordance of right-hemisphere specialisation for both emotions in general and the 
perception of music. We might infer that they are linked, and that music can 
manipulate emotions directly. The perception of music is an experience sought for 
its pleasantness, although these feelings are difficult to verbalise. When the person 
tries to verbalise these feelings via affective words, the emphasis of neuronal 
activity becomes left-hemispheric once again (Strauss, 1983).
Of course, an effect of a musical stimulus could well be 'cognitive' in nature. If 
such an effect on the symbolic play of the participants is found, the question is not 
whether symbolic play is 'cognitive' or 'affective', but rather which approach 
(representational or interpersonal) is the most appropriate 'frame' for the data. The 
suggestion here is that finding 'no effect' of the music on the play means that a 
cognitive view of symbolic play is more appropriate, because in Leslie's (1987) 
approach metarepresentation is not a result of interaction. If there was an effect of 
the music, this means that a dynamic interpersonal approach is more appropriate, 
because in Hobson’s approach (e.g. 1993) symbolic play is the result of 
interaction.
T uming to the symbolic play test itself, play was judged to be metarepresentational 
if the child referred to an absent object, attributed properties to an object which it 
did not have, or used the object as if it were another object (c.f. Leslie, 1987). 
Manipulative play and functional play were classed as non-symbolic. This is 
conservative, since it may be argued that functional play involves the suspension of 
the knowledge that the play object is different to the real object which it represents. 
For example, a child pushing a model car across a floor may have attributed the
property that the car is the appropriate size to be a 'pretend toy car'. This fits with 
Leslie's second criterion.
For the purposes of avoiding extra controversy, such play shall be regarded as 
nonsymbolic. A further feature of the symbolic play test is the application of an 
overall symbolic play score which is intended to characterise the child's symbolic 
play across the entire session. The rationale for the inclusion of such a score is for 
the purposes of statistical analysis. Producing symbolic play after an elicitation  
("What can we do with these?'') is difficult in relation to producing symbolic play 
after an instruction (e.g. "Show me how we make a seat for the doll with 
these?"). This is, in turn, difficult in relation to producing play after modelling 
("I shall do it first. Can you copy how I do it?").
Because of this relative difficulty, a score of three was given for each play act 
which occurs on elicitation, a score of two for each play act on instruction, and a 
score of one for each play act which has to be modelled by the experimenter. The 
play acts in each category shall also be considered in their own right (number of 
occurrences).
The hypothesis of this introductory study is that the inclusion of the musical 
stimulus shall have an effect on the symbolic play of the participants, either in terms 
of particular play categories, or in terms of composite symbolic play score. At this 
point the role of the music is to have a social significance which indicates the 
appropriateness of play to the child.
2.2 Method
Participants. Eighteen children were recruited from a local nursery. Their mean 
CA was 49.4 months (ranging from 44 to 53 months). There was a 1:1 ratio of 
girls to boys.
Materials:Music. The music was played to the participants via a Phillips Twin 
Tape Studio II. and the piece was an improvised instrumental named 'funny tune' 
by the local musicians who produced it.
Materials:Symbolic Play. There were two sets of toys: section (a) realistic objects; 
miniatures of a brush, a spoon, a car, a pickup truck, a cow, a gate, a motorbike, 
and a bowl: section (b) nonrealistic objects; a set of blocks, a counter, a stick, some 
felt, a rubber, a box, some foil and some playdough. With the nonrealistic toys, a 
car or a doll (child's preference) were used to facilitate play with the objects. Table 
2.1. provides summary information on the subjects and the factors involved.
Table 2 .1 Chronological Age (CA), Gender of the Subjects and Dependent and 
Independent Factors
CA Girls : Boys
Subjects (n= 18) mean 49.4m
SD 8.2m
9 :9
Independent Factor 
Dependent Factors
Presence / Absence of Music
Symbolic Play -elicited
- instructed
- modelled
- instances of no play
- composite score
Procedure. A within-participants design was adopted. Presentation of the 
symbolic play items was counterbalanced, so that a child would either experience 
the music first and odd toy items first, the music first and even toy items first, no 
music and the odd toy items first, or no music and the even toy items first. Both 
realistic and nonrealistic toys were presented in each condition.
For example, the first child to be tested would encounter the brush, the car, the cow 
and the motorbike, and the blocks, the stick, the piece of rubber and the foil (the 
odd toys) in the music condition. The child would encounter the spoon, the pickup 
truck, the gate and the bowl, and the counter, the felt, the box and the playdough in 
the control condition (the even toys). The second child would also encounter the 
music condition first, but the even toys first. The third child would encounter the 
control condition first and the odd toys first, and the fourth child would encounter 
the control condition first and the even toys first. The fifth child would mark the 
return to the beginning of this counterbalancing method.
First, the playback of the music would be started if appropriate. The child would 
then be presented with (depending on counterbalancing) the brush, the spoon, the 
car and the bowl, or the pickup truck, the cow, the gate, and the motorbike. Each 
toy was considered as one potentially symbolic item.
The experimenter would then ask the child of the toy "What can we do with 
this/these?" (in the hope of eliciting symbolic play). If the child demonstrated 
symbolic play, a score of 3 was recorded, and the experimenter moved on to the 
next toy item. If no play was demonstrated at this stage, the experimenter would 
instruct the child to play symbolically (e.g. "Show me how we eat some soup with 
the spoon"). If the child demonstrated symbolic play at this stage, a score of 2 was 
recorded, and the experimenter moved on to the next item, beginning again with
elicitation. If no play was demonstrated at this stage, the experimenter would 
model a symbolic behaviour ("I shall do it first. Can you copy how I do it?"). If 
the child demonstrated symbolic play at this stage, a score of I was recorded. In 
any case, the experimenter moved on to the next item, starting again with elicitation.
This process was repeated until all the items in the realistic section had been 
presented. The same procedure was executed for the nonrealistic items, with the 
added feature of the presence of the doll or car. The child would be presented 
(depending on counterbalancing) with the blocks, the counter, the stick and the felt, 
or the rubber, the box, the foil and the playdough. Throughout the procedure, the 
instances where play was only functional or manipulative in nature were also 
recorded. However, if nonsymbolic play was recorded the experimenter would still 
attempt to obtain symbolic play. For instructions for symbolic play please refer to 
Appendix 2.1.
Symbolic play and nonsymbolic play were analysed in two ways; by the 
frequencies of each type of play, and by composite scores built from all the types of 
play demonstrated in each condition (3 for elicited. 2 for instructed, 1 for modelled, 
and 0 for no response).
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Since there was a maximum of only eight symbolic and eight non-symbolic acts in 
each condition for each child, results were considered using the Friedman test, 
which is a non-parametric equivalent of a repeated-measures one-way analysis of 
variance. The results of this series of tests are shown in table 2.2 (ANOVA results 
are shown in Appendix 2.2). It will be seen that only elicited symbolic play was 
significantly higher in the music condition. This supports the hypothesis that the 
symbolic play of young children can be influenced by a stimulus which has a social 
significance, e.g. instrumental music.
2.3 Results
Table 2.2 Results of Friedman Tests for the Effect of Condition on Play
Variable Mean in Mean in Friedman p
music condition control condition Test Statistic
Elicited Symbolic Play 5.0 3.6 10.9 0 . 0
Instructed Symbolic Play 1.7 1.2 0.0 0.5
Modelled Symbolic Play 0.1 0.6 1.4 0.2
Elicited Nonsymbolic Play 0.4 1.5 2.0 0.2
Instructed Nonsymbolic Play 0.3 0.4 0.1 0.8
Instances of No Response 0.8 0.4 1.4 0.2
n.b. Modelled nonsy mbolic play was not demonstrated in cither condition.
Figure 2.1 Mean Number of Symbolic Play Acts by Category and Condition
Music Condition Control Condition
Figure 2.2 Mean Number of Nonsymbolic Play Acts by Category and Condition
Music Condition Control Condition
Figure 2.3 Mean Number of Instances Where No Response Was Made
Figure 2.1 demonstrates the mean number of symbolic acts by category of play and 
condition, figure 2.2 demonstrates the mean number of nonsymbolic play acts by 
category of play and condition, and figure 2.3 demonstrates the mean number of 
instances where the child did not respond at all, by condition. When composite 
symbolic play scores were analysed for possible condition effects, significantly 
higher scores were found in the music-present condition (F( I,I7)=7.4, p<0.05). 
For additional statistical control, the data was entered into a 3-way Analysis of 
Variance to test for possible two- or three-way interactions of condition, 
(counterbalanced) order of condition, and (counterbalanced) order of toy set 
presentation. Only the condition effect reported above was significant. This 
strongly suggests that the presence of music was responsible for the difference 
across conditions. The fact that elicited play was higher in the music condition 
whilst other types of symbolic play were not significantly different will be 
discussed. A further ANOVA suggested no significant sex effects.4
The effect of condition on composite non-symbolic play scores was not significant 
(F( l,17)=2.4, p=0.1). However, because this type of play was only demonstrated 
in the absence of symbolic play, the relative infrequency of non-symbolic play 
undermines this result.
4 U nfortunately, it was im possible to construct a four-way analysis of 
variance including sex effects because o f  the loss of statistical power. 
However, a regression analy sis  with stepw ise deletion in which all four 
variables were included suggested that gender, o rd er of condition, and 
o rd e r of toy set p resen tation  did not p red ict composite symbolic play 
score. The effect of cond itio n  was again observed.
2.4 Discussion
The symbolic play of the preschool children was influenced by the inclusion of a 
musical stimulus. In looking at the categories of symbolic play separately, it was 
clear that the difference lay in elicited symbolic play. It will be remembered that 
elicited symbolic play entails the production of the symbolic idea by the child. 
Therefore, it seems that the generative symbolic play of young children may be 
influenced by musical stimuli. However it has to be remembered that because there 
was no reliability testing of the symbolic play data , there is the possibility of bias.
Bias notwithstanding, these results raise a number of possibilities. If, as suggested 
in 2.1, instrumental music is an 'affective' stimulus, processed primarily in the 
right hemisphere, then it may be concluded that symbolic play has a relationship to 
emotional changes brought about by 'affective' stimuli.
At the very least, it seems that the degree to which metarepresentations are 
generated behaviourally will vary considerably, depending on changes in the 
environment, of which the presence or absence of music is one example.
Given this, it seems that one should expect symbolic play to be sensitive to social 
cues and changes in the social environment. However, it is not clear whether 
emotion or attention change on the inclusion of a musical stimulus. Investigation of 
the role of these variables might shed further light upon the process by which 
symbolic play is influenced by the musical stimulus.
In order to examine if emotion or attention are influenced by the music, a scale was 
designed to rate the child's affective mood and attention to the experimental task. 
Chapter 3 shall examine the design, validation and piloting of the scale, and its 
relation to the results presented so far.
It is very important to examine the possibility that the music was in fact a 'cue' 
which the child perceives and cognises as 'requiring' more metarepresentationa! 
behaviour. It is reasonable to expect 'affective mood' and 'attention to a task' to be 
independent factors.
If the music has a primarily 'affective' significance, then this is more easily 
explained within the context of an interpersonal relatedness approach. If the music 
has an attentive significance, then this might be more adequately framed within a 
cognitive perspective.
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Chapter 3
The Development of a Scale to Kate Affective Mood and Attention to 
the Experimental Task
3.1 Introduction
A specific hypothesis can be proposed on the basis of the results of the introductory 
study described in chapter 2. about the nature of the effect of the musical stimulus 
on the symbolic play of the participants. The effect could be framed in terms of 
'affect' if the primary response to the stimulus is emotional and leads to an increase 
in symbolic play. Alternatively, the effect could be framed in terms of 'attention' if 
the primary response to the musical stimulus is one of increased attention to the 
task.
Although it may be naive to suggest that 'cognition' is the only function of 
sustained attention to a play task, an attentional effect due to a musical stimulus 
which results in increased symbolic play might entail that the child constructs a 
concept that more symbolic behaviour is required (rather than simply enjoying the 
task more). This type of effect could be framed in an updated metarepresentational 
model of pretence. The updating would take the form of viewing symbolic play, 
not only as a function of metarepresentational cognitions, but also as a product of 
cognitions about the amount of attention which is appropriate to a particular 
potential symbolic play situation.
An effect of affect due to the musical stimulus is not so easily framed in 
metarepresentational terms. Hobson (1993) points out that l^eslie's (1987) concept 
of the decoupling mechanism does not have anything to do with emotion; it would
seem that Leslie views affect as either independent of the metarepresentational 
function or at least unimportant in explaining either symbolic play or autism.
In this chapter, the development of a rating scale which is designed to rate affective 
mood and attention to the symbolic play task is described. This development 
included two phases. The first phase was the design and establishment of face 
validity. The second phase was the piloting of the scale which was in fact carried 
out during the experimental testing described in 2.2. For clarity, this procedure is 
to be separately described in this chapter.
The objective of this study is to examine whether it is possible to devise a short 
rating scale which examines affective mood and attention to a particular task. 
Further to this end. the piloting of the scale which was carried out during the 
introductory study described in chapter 2. shall be reported.
3.2 Materials
Three scales of twelve items each were constructed. Each item consisted of a single 
statement. The first was designed to measure immediate affective mood. The 
second was designed to measure the level of sustained attention to a task. The third 
was a control scale, which was intended to measure neither affect nor attention in 
particular. The statements were presented with the numbers one to five. This was 
intended to allow the rater to either strongly agree with the statement (SA), agree 
with the statement (A), neither agree nor disagree with the statement (N), disagree 
with the statement (D), or strongly disagree with the statement (SD). Statements 
were counterbalanced for positivity / negativity so that perseverance effects would 
not introduce bias. Table 3.1 demonstrates some sample items from the affect 
scale. It was intended that these responses should be given appropriate numerical 
scoring. For example, if the particular statement was negative in nature and the 
rater was to (e.g.) strongly disagree, this meant a score of five. If the particular 
statement was positive in nature and the rater was to (e.g.) disagree with the 
statement, this meant a score of two.
Table 3.1 Sample items from the Affect Scale
3, The child is not enjoying the task.
4. The child is engaged happily in the task.
SD D N A SA 
SD D N A SA
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These scales underwent two validation exercises. In the first of these, five 
independent raters were presented with the 36 items randomly on separate cards. 
They were asked to sort the cards into three piles: ( 1 ) affect, (2) attention and (3) 
general arousal, on the basis of which pile they thought the statement belonged.
For a statement to be accepted as valid, the criterion adopted was correct sorting by 
four out of five raters.
In the second validation exercise, the same five raters were presented with the three 
twelve-statement scales individually, and asked to suggest what they felt each scale 
was designed to measure. This exercise was completed a week after the first, in 
order to avoid the raters remembering the piles they had sorted particular statements
3.3 Procedure 1: Kxamination of Face Validity
into.
3.4 Results 1: Examination o f  Face Validity
In the first validation exercise, ten statements from the affect scale and ten 
statements from the attention scale were correctly sorted by at least four out of five 
independent raters. This suggests that these statements may be used as items in a 
rating scale designed to measure affective mood and sustained attention to task.
In the second validation exercise, all five raters chose to attribute appropriate labels 
to the three scales presented. These results can be viewed in Table 3.2.
Table 3.2 Raters' Labels of the Affect / Attention / General Arousal Scales
Rater
I 2 .t 4 S
A f f e c t
S c a le
A f f e c t
( 'o n te n tm e n t  
1 l a p p in e s s
A ffe c t
A t t e n t io n M o t i v a t i o n A t t e n t io n
I n v o lv e m e n t  
( 'o n c e n t  r a t io n
( 'o n c e n t  r a t i o n
( ic  n e ra l ( i c n e r a l  a r o u s a l ( i c n c r a l  a r o u s a l
A r o u s a l 1 E m o tio n a li ty  
I n te r e s t
( 'o n t e n t m e n t A f f e c t A f f e c t
D e p r e s s i o n
U n h a p p i n e s s
A t t e n t io n A t t e n t i o n  
M o t i v a t i o n  
I E n g a g e m e n t
A t t e n t i o n
M o t i v a t i o n 1 E m o tio n a l i ty  
1 E x c i ta b i l i ty  
B e h a v i o u r  s w i n g s
A r o u s a l
This supports the use of the correctly-sorted statements as items in a rating scale 
designed to measure affect and attention-lo-task. The complete rating scale thus 
consisted of the 10 items of the original affect scale and the 10 items of the original 
attention scale which were correctly sorted. The completed rating scale can be 
viewed in Appendix 3 .1.
Piloting took place while the experimenter was gathering the data of the 
introductory study described in chapter two. After the symbolic play procedure had 
been carried out and the child was returned to her / his classroom, the experimenter 
completed the rating scale for the particular child, before seeing the next child.
The reader will remember that a repeated measures design was adopted, with 18 
children (nine girls and nine boys, aged 44-53 months). The two conditions were 
the 'music' condition and the 'control' condition.
Scores were built in the following way. The answer to each statement indicated a 
score of one to five. The theoretical range of scores was therefore between (1*10 
items) 10 and (5* 10 items) 50. Thus, each child would have an 'affect' score and 
an 'attention' score for each condition, 'music present', and 'music absent', of
3.5 Procedure 2: Piloting of the Rating Scale
between 10 and 50.
Preliminary results from the piloting of the rating scale suggested that the difference 
in attention scores between conditions was not significant (Friedman test 
statistic=2.7, p=0.1). Flowever. affect scores were significantly higher in the 
music-present condition (Friedman test statistic =9.4. pcO.OI). Flowever. these 
results should be treated with caution, since there was only a single rater, who 
could potentially be a source of bias. Table 3.3 shows the means.
3.6 Results 2: Piloting the Rating Scale
Table 3.3 Means for Affect and Attention in Each Condition 
Music Condition
Mean SD
Affect 38.4 4.7
Attention 40.4 2.8
Control Condition
Mean SD
Affect 32.3 7.8
Attention 38.6 3.5
74
The rating scale which was designed to measure affective mood and attention to 
task would seem to have some face validity on the basis of these findings, at least 
insofar as they have been identified as 'affect' and 'attention' scales. Preliminary 
results also suggest that the affect of the children in the introductory study was 
more positive in the music-present condition than in the music-absent condition. 
Furthermore the development of the scale allowed the design of a study which 
examines the symbolic play of children with autism and their response to the 
presence of music, with the inclusion of affective and attentive variables.
At this point we do not know w hether the potential effect is a calming one. or a 
social indication to the child that more play is appropriate. Yet whether calming or 
indicative, the effect would imply the need for a model of symbolic development 
including factors other than symbolic ability. Deciding between a calming effect 
and an indicative effect is not something which can be attempted at this stage, and 
without replication the question does not arise further.
The next study shall also examine whether affect and attention to task differ 
according to the presence or absence of a musical stimulus. Replication of the 
effect of music on symbolic play and affect ratings would add confidence to the 
findings presented so far. These preliminary results, if valid, are more easily 
accommodated by an interpersonal rclatedness approach to symbolic play than by 
the original metarepresentational approach. This is because Hobson (e.g. 1993) 
implies the importance of affect whereas Leslie (1987) does not allude to affect at 
all. However, these preliminary results require confirmation, using a procedure 
which can be tested for reliability, before we can make any firm conclusions about 
their implications for the theory of mind and interpersonal theories of symbolic 
play.
3.7 Discussion
Chapter 4
The Effect of a Musical Stimulus on the Affect, Attention and 
Symbolic Play of Children with Autism and Controls
4.1 Introduction
The study which shall be presented in this chapter had several objectives. First, it 
was seen to be important to replicate the effect of the musical stimulus on the 
symbolic play of young children, in order to be sure that the effect found in the 
previous study is reliable. Second, it was seen to be important to examine children 
with autism, because their lack of symbolic play is identified as evidence of poor 
interpersonal relatedness / poor metarepresentation by Hobson (1993) / Leslie 
(1987). Third, relationships between affect, attention and symbolic play were to be 
examined in order to discriminate between the metarepresentational view of 
symbolic play, or the interpersonal relatedness view of symbolic play.
The lack of symbolic play in children with autism has been described as 
representative of a cognitive deficit (e.g. Baron-Cohen, 1987), but these findings 
have now been elaborated. It was suggested by Ungerer and Sigman (1981) that 
structuring a situation (such as by asking a question or modelling the symbolic act) 
increases the level of symbolic play demonstrated by children with autism. This 
has been supported (for a review see Jarrold. Boucher and Smith, 1993).
In a further refinement to our knowledge of symbolic play in autism, 1-ewis and 
Boucher ( 1995) suggest that nenerativity in play, rather than symbolic ability per 
se, may be impaired in autism. In their study, the performance of children with 
autism in symbolic play was not inferior to that of controls when ideas were 
provided in the form of instructions. Performance was inferior in an 'elicited'
condition where the children had to generate theirown symbolic ideas (whilst still 
being encouraged to play by the experimenter). It is important for the current study 
to take account of these findings, and contrast elicited symbolic play with instructed 
symbolic play.
It is widely accepted that the affect of children with autism is different from that of 
controls in situations w hich require social attention (e.g. Kasari, Sigman, 
Baumgartner and Stipek. 1993). As seen in 1.4, there is considerable evidence that 
affective contact with others is poorly established by children with autism (e.g. 
Lord, 1984). Also, affective sharing in joint-attention situations is poor in children 
with autism (e.g. Loveland and L a^ndry. 1986). as is the perception of affect, in 
which they may develop abnormal strategies in order to compensate (e.g. Hobson, 
Ouston and Lee, 1988). They are also more idiosyncratic in their emotional 
expressiveness, and show empathy less often.
It was important to include attention in this study since the role of affect in autism 
seems intimately involved with attention to social stimuli. As in the previous study, 
non-spontaneous symbolic play was examined. Only one of the categories of 
symbolic play involves symbolic generativity (elicited symbolic play) and so it is 
possible to examine whether this is indeed what is specifically impaired in autism. 
Affect and attention shall be rated by two independent raters, from videotapes of the 
play. Again, 'affective mood' and 'sustained attention to the task' were the precise 
variables to be measured.
One change to the methodology was introduced. Non-symbolic play was found to 
be too rare in the first study (see 2.3) for reliable measurement. Therefore non- 
symbolic play was estimated whenever symbolic play is demonstrated, and a score 
assigned which 'shadowed' the symbolic play. Lor example, a symbolic act 
produced on instruction yielded a symbolic play score of 2 and a non-symbolic play
score of 2. The rationale for this is that symbolic play necessarily entails 
manipulative play. This should mean that the non-symbolic content of the play is 
more accurately represented statistically.
Finally, the interaction of the symbolic play score, affect score, and attention score 
was examined. Ozonoff. Pennington and Rogers (1991) suggested that emotional 
and cognitive abilities (e.g. emotion perception, false belief understanding) are 
more closely related in children with autism than in other children. It is important to 
examine this possibility since this may help in discriminating between the 
metarepresentational and interpersonal relatedness accounts of symbolic play and 
autism. For example, high correlations between symbolic play and affect would 
suggest that a full explanation of symbolic play needs to be explained in both 
cognitive and affective terms - the metarepresentational approach as originally 
proposed does not do this.
There is a further issue which may limit the implications of this study, namely that 
the children are chronologically older than those in the previous study, the 
difference between mean ages being some six years. Care should be exercised 
when comparing these studies. Autistic children are generally less intellectually 
able than children of a similar age and the measures were initially pitched towards 
those autistic children who were likely to show some play, i.e. the more 
intellectually able.
4.2 Method
Participants. Thirteen children with autism (who had received psychiatric diagnosis 
according to DSM-III-R) and 13 children in mainstreamed schools were selected for 
the experiment. Participants were matched via the Test for the Reception of 
Grammar (TROG: Bishop. 1983). Table 4.1 demonstrates the CA. Gender, and 
TROG age equivalences of the children included in the study. The TROG was 
administered by the experimenter approximately two weeks before the experimental 
procedure. Since the controls were slightly more able, an analysis of variance was 
conducted to test for a significant group difference in receptive language ability. 
This was not found.
Table 4.1 Gender, Chronological Age. and Receptive language Age Equivalence
Gender 
(Girls : Boys)
CA TROG
Autism 4 :9 Mean 10.3 9.0
(n=13) SD 4.1 2.7
Controls 5 :8 Mean 9.8 9.7
3 II '-»
J SD 4.3 1.5
Independent Factors Presence / Absence of Music
Group
Dependent Factors Symbolic Play -elicited
- instructed
- modelled
- instances of no play
- composite play score
Rated Affect 
Rated Attention
Materials and Procedure. The materials and procedure for this experiment were 
identical to that described in 2.2, with the exception of the following. The play 
sessions were recorded by a JVC PAL VideoStar recorder with a tripod. These 
recordings were played back to two independent raters at a later date. Raters filled 
out one affect / attention rating scale (see Appendix 3.1) for each child for each 
condition. The rater would first watch an entire session, then the tape was paused 
for the rater to fill out the scale. The rater then moved on to the clip of the next 
child.
There were thus raw scores of symbolic play (frequencies of each category of play 
and composite scores), non-symbolic play, affect and attention for each condition, 
within the case of affect and attention, a score for each rater for each condition.
There was one methodological change to the procedure described in 2.2. Non- 
symbolic play was scored even when symbolic play was demonstrated, by 
recording a score which 'shadowed' symbolic play. For example, if the child only 
demonstrated manipulative play after modelling, the child would be given a score of 
0 for symbolic play and 1 for non-symbolic play. If the child demonstrated 
symbolic play after instruction, s/he would be given a score of 2 for symbolic play 
and 2 for non-symbolic play. It was therefore assumed that symbolic play 
necessarily entails manipulative play and is a 'higher-order' activity.
4.3 Results
Inter-rater reliability was calculated using intraclass correlations (ICC 2,2 : Shrout 
and Fleiss. 1979). These were calculated at 0.62 (p<0.02) for affect and 0.78 
(pxO.Ol) for attention. This was judged to indicate sufficient reliability for the raw 
affect and attention scores of the two raters to be averaged and considered as single 
scores. No reliability coefficient for symbolic play was computed, since play was 
scored by a single rater, and the data was not suitable for split-half reliability 
estimation (within-group-within-condition comparisons would lack statistical 
power). This is an important qualification of the results.
First, it was judged important to examine group differences in symbolic play. 
Second, it was judged to be important to examine whether there was any effect of a 
musical stimulus on either symbolic play, affect or attention in each group. Third, 
it was possible to examine relationships between symbolic play scores, affect 
scores, and attention scores in each group and each condition. To meet the first of 
these objectives, a series of Mann-Whitney U tests were carried out on the play 
variables within each condition. The results are reported in table 4.2. Analyses of 
variance were also carried out, and can be viewed in Appendix 4.1. No interactions 
of group by condition were found.
It will be seen that the children with autism exhibited less elicited symbolic play in 
the music condition*, and also in the control condition. In addition, the children 
with autism demonstrated more instances where they did not respond at all, in both 
the music condition, and in the control condition. These differences can be 
observed in figures 4 .1 (play by condition and category in the children with 
autism), 4.2 (play by condition and category in the controls) and 4.3 (non­
responses by condition and group).
*This result was not significant using ANOVA (See Appendix 4 .1)
Table 4.2 Mann-Whitney U Tests for G roup Differences in Play in the Music and
Control Conditions
M u s ic  C o  m il I ion
Vanablc Mean: autistics Mean: controls y E
Elicited Symbolic Play 4.2 5.8 36.5 < 0 .0 2 *
Instructed Symbolic Play I S 1.8 09.0 0.4
Modelled Symbolic Play 0.6 0.2 109.5 0.1
Elicited Nonsymbolic Play 5.8 6.2 80.0 0.8
Instructed Nonsymbolic Play 1.2 1.5 68.5 0.4
Modelled Nonsymbolic Play 0.3 0.2 92.0 0.6
Instances of No Response 1.4 0.1 143.0 <0.01
C o n t r o l  C o n d itio n
Vanablc Mean: autistics Mean: controls y E
Elicited Sy mbolic Play 3.8 5.1 43.5 <0.04
Instructed Symbolic Play O •"» 1.7 86.0 0.9
Modelled Symbolic Play 0.5 0.8 99.0 0.3
Elicited Nonsymbolic Play 0.4 1.0 78.0 0.7
Instructed Nonsymbolic Play 0.5 0.6 73.0 0.5
Modelled Nonsymbolic Play 1.0 2.0 87.5 0.8
Instances of No Response 1.5 0.5 126.0 0.02
nb this result was not significant using A N O V A  (sec Appendix 4.1)
Figure 4.1 Mean No. of Symbolic Play Acts by Condition and Category; Autism
7
■  Elicited
■  Instructed 
O  Modelled
Music Condition Control Condition
Figure 4.2 Mean No. of Symbolic Play Acts by Condition and Category; Controls 
7
■  Elicited
■  Instructed 
H I Modelled
Music Condition Control Condition
Figure 4.3 Mean no. of Instances Where No Response Was Made; Both Groups 
7 - 
6- 
5- 
4 - 
3 - 
2- 
1
0-
Autism
Controls
Music Condition Control Condition
To meet the second objective, a series of Friedman tests were carried out on the 
play variables within each group. The results are reported in table 4.3. The only 
result which reached significance was the condition effect on elicited symbolic play 
in the controls. This result can be observed in figure 4.2.
To meet the final objective, a series of nonparametric and highly conservative 
correlation coefficients were computed. Kendall's Tau-B. Composite symbolic 
play scores, affect scores and attention scores were correlated, for each group in 
each condition. The results are demonstrated in table 4.4. It can be seen that in the 
music condition, all three variables were significantly correlated in the children with 
autism, but only affect and attention were correlated in the controls. In the control 
condition, symbolic play w as correlated with affect and attention in the children 
w ith autism, but no relationships were apparent in the control group.
Table 4.3 By-Group Friedman Tests for the Effects of M usic on Play
Autism Group
Variable Friedman Test Statistic probability
Klicited Symbolic Play 0.3 0.6
Instructed Symbolic Play 0.3 0.6
Modelled Symbolic Play 0.3 0.6
Elicited Nonsymbolic Play 0.1 0.8
Instructed Nonsymbolic Play 0.7 0.4
Modelled Nonsymbolic Play 0.1 0.8
Instances of No Response 0.1 0.8
Control Group
Variable Friedman Test Statistic probability
Elicited Symbolic Play 2.8 0 .0 5
Instructed Symbolic Play 0.7 0.4
Modelled Symbolic Play 0.1 0.8
Elicited Nonsymbolic Play 0.0 1.0
Instructed Nonsymbolic Play 0.3 0.6
Modelled Nonsymbolic Play 0.3 0.6
Instances of No Response 0.7 0.4
NB for means, please refer to Table 4.2.
Table 4.4 By-Group and By-Condition Kendall Tau-B Correlation Matrices for 
Composite Symbolic Play Scores. Affect Scores and Attention Scores
Autism Group
Music Condition
Symbolic Play
Symbolic Play Affect
Affect 0.39*
Attention 0.45* 0.40*
Control Condition
Symbolic Play
Symbolic Play Affect
Affect 0.34*
Attention 0.60** ns
Music Condition
Control Group
Symbolic Play Affect
Symbolic Play
Affect ns
Attention ns 0.40*
Control Condition
Symbolic Play
Symbolic Play Affect
Affect ns
Attention ns ns
*p<0.05 **p<0.01 ns: not significant
4.4 Discussion
These results suggest that there is less symbolic generativity in children with autism 
(less elicited symbolic play). Also, these results suggest that there is an effect of 
music on the elicited symbolic play of children without autism, supporting the 
results of the introductory study reported in chapter two. However, there were no 
effects or interactions of group and condition to be found when ANOVAs were 
used. There were relationships between composite symbolic play scores and affect 
scores / attention scores, but they were specific to the autistic children.
The replication of the effect of the musical stimulus on the controls is important for 
obvious reasons. It would seem that the music being played signalled to the 
controls that more elicited symbolic play was appropriate, and that they should 
respond more often. This was not the case with the children with autism. A 
calming effect is possible, but the music was 'upbeat' in nature - it was not 
relaxing. Nevertheless we cannot discount a possible calming effect on the basis of 
the data.
The symbolic play of the children with autism reflected a generativity impairment 
which is in line with the findings of Lewis and Boucher! 1995). There were also 
more occasions where the children with autism simply did not respond. It seems 
clear that children with autism respond well to the structured nature of instructed 
symbolic play, but when they need to produce their own ideas the situation does not 
afford symbolic behaviour.
There are two reasons why these findings fail to support the hypothesis that 
symbolic play is necessarily related to social factors. First, there were no 
interactions between group and condition as factors predicting symbolic and 
nonsymbolic play, when ANOVAs were used (see Appendix 4.2). On the other
hand, there was a significant effect of condition on the elicited symbolic play of the 
controls. This is limited evidence that symbolic play is affected by a musical 
stimulus, but only in non-autistic children.
The second reason why the hypothesis is not supported is that the correlations 
between symbolic play and affect, and symbolic play and attention, were only 
found in the autistic children. Whilst this may indicate something akin to the 
correlation of executive functions in autistic children (Ozonoff et al.. 1991), it is 
poor evidence that symbolic play, affect and attention are necessarily related. 
Ozonoff. Pennington and Rogers (1991) suggest that the cognitive and emotional 
aspects of executive function may be more integrated in children with autism than in 
other children. It may be that this is also true of their perceived affective mood, 
their perceived attention-to-task, and their symbolic play.
Another finding which requires discussion is the surprisingly high number of 
symbolic play acts demonstrated by the children with autism. Josef Pemer (1993, 
1991) suggested that symbolic play entails 'acting-as-if and is not 
metarepresentational in the same way as understanding the mental states of other 
people. Pemer's challenge to Leslie is that both symbolic play and knowledge of 
mental states should be similarly delayed in children with autism, for Leslie's 
theory to be correct. Only about 20% of young children with autism could 
understand false belief in the definitive study carried out by Baron-Cohen, l^eslie 
and Frith (1985). In contrast, seven out of the 13 (54%) children with autism in the 
present study demonstrated more than one symbolic idea in the music-present 
condition, and eight out of 13 (62%) did so in the music-absent condition. 
Therefore, either this particular group of children with autism is not comparable to 
those of previous studies (perhaps too old), or Pemer is correct to suggest that 
symbolic play requires less than perception of mental states in other people.
The empirical chapters so far (chapters two, three and four) have examined the 
effects of an external stimulus on the affective, attentive and symbolic behaviour of 
children with and without autism. A problem with understanding symbolic play in 
the developing child is that the experimental design has been manipulative; we 
changed the context (included music) and this influenced symbolic play. To fully 
understand how affective mood and attention to the task relate to symbolic play, if 
they do at all. a more 'naturalistic' approach is needed. We need to consider the 
role of the natural variation of perceived affective mood and perceived attention-to- 
tasks in the symbolic play of children with autism.
As a prelude to examination of the relationships of affect, attention and symbolic 
play in chapter six. chapter five shall consider whether sufficient variation in affect 
and attention scores can be detected by the rating scale devised in chapter three, 
over several occasions. This variation must be detected if natural changes in affect 
and attention across time are to be investigated effectively. At this point we are 
assuming that such changes exist in reality.
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Chapter5
Piloting the Affective Mood/Attention-to-Tasks Rating Scale in 
Children with Autism
5.1 Introduction
Before the possible interrelationship of symbolic play, affective mood and attention 
is further examined, it is important to establish whether day-to-day change in affect 
and attention can be detected using the rating scale developed thus far. Scores 
across several occasions should demonstrate either within-subject variation or 
between-subject variation in order for scores on any particular day to be viewed as 
meaningful. That is, we have to be sure that scores found on a particular day are 
representative of either between-subject variation, or within-subject variation, in 
affective mood and attention to task. In the present pilot study, such differences in 
the scores of children with autism were examined. This group of children was 
chosen since autism is a main theoretical focus of this thesis.
Perceived affective mood and perceived attention to tasks remain the variables to be 
measured via the scale. However, to emphasise daily changes rather than transient 
changes within a particular day, the scale was now applied to a whole day. It was 
to be filled out by teachers rather than raters (see 5.2). Previously, raters who had 
no prior experience with children with autism completed the scales, and scores 
applied only to the short play symbolic play session.
The intention in the present pilot study was to capture whether familiar adults would 
perceive day-to-day changes in affect and attention, as opposed to long-term or 
transient second-by-second changes. Thus the focus of investigation is limited to 
one kind of affective / attentional variation. It is simply impossible to address all
kinds of changes. However, teachers of children with autism had reported 
anecdotally that day-to-day emotional and attentional changes were noticeable in 
children with autism. They did also report other kinds of change in children with 
autism, and this must be taken into consideration. For example, some reported 
considerable effects of lunch on mood and attention!
Another purpose for examining day-to-day changes in the perceived affect and 
attention of children with autism is to investigate the importance of a dynamic model 
of symbolic life. In the previous study (Chapter 4), significant relationships 
between affective mood, attention to task, and symbolic play were found in autistic 
children. Adding day-to-day changes into this picture will have important 
implications for the current theoretical accounts of symbolic play and autism.
If differences are mainly observed between subjects, then one can conclude that the 
children differ, but an individual child's moods, attention and perhaps play, do not 
differ across time. This can be easily assimilated by a metarepresentational account 
of symbolic play, as representative of differing levels of delay in the symbolic 
ability of children with autism (see Baron-Cohen, 1989a).
However, if differences mainly occur within subjects, then day-to-day changes in 
affective / attentive life may be important in explaining the symbolic capacities of 
children with and without autism.
5.2 Method
Participants. Fourteen children with autism were selected from local special 
schools. All had received psychiatric diagnosis of autism (DSM-III-R: APA.
1987). Their mean receptive language age. measured via the Test for the Reception 
Of Grammar (TROG; Bishop. 1983). was 5.3 (standard deviation=2.6) and their 
mean chronological age was 9.3 (standard deviation=2.9). All but two of the 
children in this study had been used in the previous study. Another two boys were 
included in the study, and one girl was excluded at the request of her parents.
Design and Procedure. Again, affective mood and perceived attention-to-tasks 
were rated. However, there were a number of important changes to the design and 
use of the scale in the present study. First, the rating scale was completed by 
teachers, who were familiar with the children, at a time during the day when the 
children were not present. This was intended to both reduce disruption to normal 
classroom activity, and to improve the ecological validity of the observations.
Second, the rating scale itself was modified to represent the child's mood and 
attention to tasks across a whole day's classroom activity, rather than a single play 
episode. The modified version of the scale is presented in Appendix 5 .1. It will be 
seen that the statements are essentially the same, with minor changes only to reflect 
the application of the scale to a whole day. For example, the statement "This child 
is simply happy" was changed to "This child has simply been happy today".
The five teachers, each of whom regularly taught the children in question, were first 
briefed about the rating which they would have to do, and then asked to participate. 
Teachers were given minimal written instructions on filling out three rating scales 
for each child (see Appendix 5.1). One scale was to be completed for each child for 
three consecutive days. It was explained that the purpose of the observations
would be fully detailed on debriefing, when the experimenter collected the 
completed scales. It was further explained that it was important that the teachers did 
not know the purpose of the observations while completing the scales. Four 
teachers rated three children each, with one teacher rating two children.
The experimenter collected the scales after the three days had passed. The teachers 
were then told that the study was intended to examine emotional and attentional 
changes which occur day-to-day.
5.3 Results
It was seen to be important to present the results for each subject in such a way as 
to reveal the extent of differences in the ratings of different teachers. Table 5.1 
demonstrates the receptive language age equivalences, the expressive language 
information and grammar scores (Renfrew Action PictureTest: Renfrew. 1966), 
and the standard deviations of each participant's three affect and attention scores (as 
well as raw scores). These standard deviations are statistically crucial, because they 
demonstrate the participants' day-to-day variation in affect and attention scores.
It will be seen from Table 5.1 that the children differed considerably in how their 
scores varied from day to day in both affect and attention. This suggests that 
affective mood and attention to tasks do vary day-to-day in a way which can be 
reliably detected via the rating scale. Also, within-subject ranges of scores were 
often considerable, the largest standard deviations being 13.4 for affect and 12.5 
for attention. Clearly, there is observable evidence for both within-subject variation 
of scores, and for between-subject differences. This could reflect either variation of 
affect and attention, or error of measurement. To find out which is the case it was 
necessary to examine the ratings of the different teachers for reliability.
Therefore the effects of the variables as predictors of each other were examined. A 
general linear model was used for this purpose, the particular model being that 
provided by Systat 5.2.1 (Systat, 1992). Two analyses were carried out initially.
In the first of these, affective mood scores were statistically predicted by attention 
scores, and the teacher variable. In the second analysis, attention scores were 
statistically predicted by affect scores and by teacher.
Affect and attention scores were significantly predictive of each other (attention 
predicts affect; T=8.8. p<O.OI: affect predicts attention; T=8.9, p<0.01).
However, the teacher variable was not significantly predictive of either (of affect; 
T=0.4, p=0.7: of attention, T=0.2, p=0.8). Analyses of variance to test for the 
significance of these regressions were highly significant (for first analysis, F=41.3, 
p<0.01; for second analysis, F=41.2. p<0.01).
To give the reader a statistical backdrop to these analyses, we can also consider a 
variable which we might expect to be significantly predicted by the teacher variable. 
For this purpose, the grammatical ability of the children was chosen. Children with 
autism were streamed according to communicative ability at the particular schools in 
question. As one might expect, grammar scores on the Renfrew Action Picture 
Test were significantly predicted by the teacher variable (T=-2.8, p<0.05) and also 
by affect and attention scores (affect; T=-3.2, p<0.01: attention; T=2.6, p<0.03). 
An analysis of variance to test for the likelihood of this regression was significant 
(F=6.0, p<0.05).
A similar analysis demonstrated that information scores on the Renfrew Action 
Picture Test, which reflect knowledge of vocabulary, were not significantly 
predicted by affect scores or attention scores (affect; T=-1.2, p>0.05: attention; 
T=0.6, p>0.05), or by the teacher variable (T=-1.8, p>0.05). Children with 
autism are often highly able in their knowledge of vocabulary, and this ability does 
not represent their communicative problems accurately (e.g. Jarrold, Boucher and 
Smith, 1993).
These results suggest that the ratings of the individual teachers were sufficiently 
reliable for differences in scores to be considered as within-subject differences and 
between-subject differences. The reader is advised to consider the standard 
deviations themselves as presented in Table 5.1. It can be seen that affect and 
attention standard deviations varied much more between subjects than between 
teachers.
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Table 5.1 Ranges and standard deviations of each participant's affect and attention 
scores, receptive and expressive language ability
A  ITcct Attention
Child Teacher Range S D Range S D
1 1 20 1 0 .0 15 7 . 7
s 1 5 1 0 .6 16 11.3
3 1 21 1 1.8 18 9 . 9
4 -> 7 4 . 0 6 3 . 5
5 -t 19 13 .4 16 11.3
6 -t 9 5 . 2 7 4 . 0
7 3 5 2 . 5 12 6 . 0
8 3 11 8 . 6 17 8 . 5
9 3 24 12 .5 12 6 . 4
10 4 4 2 .3 -> 1.0
I I 4 18 9 .3 6 3 . 5
12 4 16 8 . 5 14 7 . 8
13 5 11 7 . 0 9 4 . 6
14 5 2 2 1 1.0 25 12.5
T R O G Renfrew (expressive)
(receptive)
Age equivalence Information Grammar
6 24.5 16
8 30 26
8 31 25
6 35 22
10 36 29
10 23.5 20
4.5 22.5 8
4.25 31 27
10 27 20
4.5 33 17
5.25 13.5 8
4 18 12
4 21.5 13
8 34.5 21
Furthermore, interesting correlations were found between the standard deviations 
and the language ability data. Children who demonstrated a high standard deviation 
of their three affect scores also tended to demonstrate a high standard deviation of 
their three attention scores (r=0.745. p<O.OI). More interesting than this, children 
who demonstrated high standard deviations in attention scores tended to be more 
able in receiving language (r=0.707, p<0.01) and in expressing language with 
correct grammar (r=0.546. p<0.05). Flowever, there was no significant correlation 
between ability to give correct information via language, and attention standard 
deviations. Standard deviations of affect scores were not significantly related to 
language ability. The participants' chronological ages did not correlate with the 
affect standard deviations or the attention standard deviations.
5.4 Discussion
In this preliminary pilot study, considerable day-to-day variation in affect and 
attention scores was found both within- and between-subjects. This indicates that it 
is meaningful to investigate relationships of affective mood, attention to tasks and 
symbolic play, using this rating scale. Some subjects varied considerably in both 
affect and attention, some varied very little. Between-subject differences in the 
standard deviations of each participant's three affect and attention scores, were 
more marked than differences between teachers. The teacher variable, which was 
able to predict the grammatical ability of the children, could not predict standard 
deviations in affect or attention scores. Also, interesting correlations between 
increased language ability and increased variation in attention scores were found. 
Let us consider these findings in turn.
The findings regarding within-participant and between-participant differences in the 
three affect / attention scores confirm that teachers perceive daily changes in 
affective mood and attention to tasks, in children with autism. The degree of 
change varies from child to child. Therefore, it is meaningful to examine natural 
variations of this type, and their relationship to symbolic play, using the rating 
scale.
There are theoretical implications of these findings for symbolic play and associated 
affective / attentive factors in children with autism. Every affective or attentive 
score recorded on a particular day needs to be viewed as something which does not 
necessarily represent the child's long-term mood or attentional ability. It may only 
be true of that particular day. The importance of this finding is amplified by the 
relationships of affect, attention and symbolic play in autistic children, repotted in
The performance of children with autism on tests of symbolic play may not reflect 
their 'metarepresentational' ability, or at least not solely. Affective and attentive 
changes might have a role. As yet. we have no firm reasons to invoke the concept 
of interpersonal relatedness, rather than a model of computational 
metarepresentati on.
However, we might suspect that Hobson's approach is useful when looking at 
affect and attention: Leslie's ( 1987) model of symbolic play does not focus on these 
factors. Some problems have already been identified with Leslie's approach, 
regarding the disparity of the capacity of children with autism for ( I ) symbolic play 
and (2) understanding the mental states of other people. However we certainly 
cannot w hole-heartedly accept Hobson’s arguments on the basis of the data 
presented here.
The correlation of the standard deviations of the attention scores with receptive 
language age equivalence, and expressive language grammar scores, is somewhat 
surprising. It may indicate secondary psychological problems of children with 
autism, w ho develop partial linguistic and social skills. Through frustration about 
partial social accomplishments these children may oscillate in their attention to social 
tasks.
Chapter 6 shall further examine the relationship of symbolic play, affective mood 
and attention to tasks on a single occasion. This can now be done with some 
confidence in the rating scale developed thus far. Affect and attention shall be 
assumed to be representative of other-percei ved daily states of affective mood and 
attention-to-tasks. Assuming naturally-occurring changes in these variables, we 
can now examine a 'snapshot' of symbolic play, affect and attention.
Chapter 6
An Observational Study of Symbolic Play, Affect and Attention in 
Children with Autism and Non-autistic Controls
6.1 Introduction
Daily changes in perceived affective mood and perceived attention to tasks, as well 
as individual differences, were shown in children with autism in the previous study 
(chapter five). Assuming that the rating scale can detect such changes, symbolic 
play, affect and attention can be examined on a particular occasion, with reasonable 
confidence that such scores reflect some degree of natural variation (within and 
between-subjects).
It will be important in the present study to replicate two things. First, that the 
symbolic play of children with autism demonstrates inferior symbolic generativity 
to that of controls. Second, that there are relationships between affect, attention and 
symbolic play in children with autism.
Results of the second study to examine symbolic play (chapter four) demonstrated 
that f>enerativity in symbolic play, rather than the ability to complete a symbolic act 
per se, underlies the problems of children with autism in symbolic play. The 
children with autism did not provide significantly fewer symbolic acts when 
symbols were provided in the form of instructions (instructed symbolic play). The 
profile of symbolic acts showed fewer responses from the children with autism, 
when the experimenter did not provide the idea whilst still encouraging the child to 
play (elicited symbolic play). This finding is in line with those of Lewis and 
Boucher (1995), who emphasise the importance of understanding the different 
forms of symbolic play when explaining symbolic impairments in autism. The
present study shall include examination of symbolic generativity for the purpose of 
further replication.
In addition, the present study shall further examine relationships of symbolic play, 
affective mood and attention to tasks. These were found in the second symbolic 
play study (chapter four) in the children with autism, but not in the mainstreamed 
controls. The replication of these relationships is of some import, since their 
occurrence has major theoretical implications. Simply stated, if these relationships 
occur, a theoretical account of autism which includes affective, attentive and 
symbolic elements will be the most adequate to explain symbolic play in autism. In 
effect, this will mean that the interpersonal relatedness approach to autism is 
superior to the metarepresentational approach, at least insofar as Leslie (1987) 
attempts to conceptualise symbolic behaviour in autism.
This procedure will have some elements in common with the control condition of 
the study reported in Chapter 4. However, there will be two crucial differences. 
The previous study included counterbalancing to avoid confounding effects of the 
order of condition. As a result half of the subjects will have already experienced the 
music condition by the time they experienced the control condition. This 
contaminates any comparison with the present study. This comprises the first 
difference.
The second difference is the choice of control subjects. At the time of the design of 
the present study, an important paper was published which outlined methodological 
issues in studies of emotion perception in children with autism (Hobson, 1991b). 
One of the issues which applies to the studies of this thesis is the importance of 
assigning appropriate controls. Hobson ( 1991b) points out that children who do 
not have autism but who have general intellectual delay, are more comparable to 
children with autism than younger children in mainstream education. This is
because general intellectual delay does not confound autism-specific impairments 
when controls also have such delays. The final two studies of the present thesis 
take account of this issue by including controls who do not have autism but who 
have general delay. Other studies of symbolic play which have used these controls 
have been shown to be methodologically superior to those which do not by Jarrold. 
Boucher and Smith (1993).
There is another methodological issue which is addressed in the design of the 
present study. In the first and second studies which included symbolic play tests 
(chapters two and four) two types of toy were included; realistic and non-realistic. 
However, it is not always clear whether 'realistic' toys can be viewed as 'symbolic' 
whenever a child engages in a behaviour which fulfils the criteria for 
metarepresentation (c.f. Leslie. 1987). In many cases, during the procedure of the 
previous play studies, 'functional' play which reflects the realistic characteristics of 
the play object was classed as non-symbolic. This was done to be conservative. 
However Lowe and Costello (1976) view functional play such as pushing a toy car 
as 'symbolic', since the child is pretending that the car has characteristics which it 
does not have (it is not a full-size car, it does not have an engine, etc.). To address 
this issue, the present study includes only non-realistic toys where this issue does 
not arise. To compensate for loss of statistical power, more non-realistic toys were 
included, than in previous studies (chapters two and four).
6.2 Method
Participants. Two groups of young people were chosen from local special schools; 
I4children with autism and 14children without autism who had general intellectual 
delay. The children with autism were the same group who had been seen in the 
previous study. All had received psychiatric diagnosis of autism (DSM-III-R. 
APA. 1987). The groups were matched for receptive language ability on the Test 
for the Reception of Grammar (TROG: Bishop. 1983). Expressive language was 
also measured for the purpose of additional information, using the Renfrew Action 
Picture Test (Renfrew. 1966). Table 6 .1 shows the gender, chronological age 
(CA), and language abilities of the two groups. A series of one-way analyses of 
variance failed to show any significant group differences in receptive language age 
equivalence, or expressive language information or grammar scores.
Materials. Six non-realistic toys were presented to the children. It was not 
immediately obvious that these objects were for play. In order for the children to 
know that the toys were for play, a teddy bear was also included although the teddy 
was not considered a test item in itself. The toys were; some blocks, a piece of 
rubber, a piece of tubular plastic, a short stick, some felt, and some playdough.
Affect and attention were measured by the rating scale developed in the first, second 
and third empirical chapters (Chapters two, three and four), and further refined in 
the pilot study of the previous chapter (Chapter five). The scale was not changed in 
design from that detailed in Appendix 5 .1, only in the manner of its use. described 
below. It will be remembered that minor changes had been made to the scale in 
order to assess the child's affective mood and attention to tasks across a whole day 
rather than a single play session.
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Table 6.1 Gender, chronological age, receptive language age equivalence and 
expressive language scores
Gender CA TROG Renfrew
Girls: Boys Information Grammar
Autism 3: 11 Mean 9.3 5.3 27.2 18.9
2iic SD 2.8 2.2 6.8 6.8
Controls 6 :8 Mean 10.0 4.6 23.1 15.8
3 II £ SD 1.7 0.9 5.2 6.7
Independent Factor Group
Dependent Factors Symbolic Play -elicited
- instructed
- modelled
- instances of no play
- composite score
Rated Affect 
Rated Attention
Procedure. The observer first spent about 30 minutes in each class prior to testing. 
Each child was then tested individually for symbolic play and manipulative play in a 
quiet area of the school. The experimenter and the child sat at a low table facing 
each other.
Each child was shown the teddy. The observer explained that it was soon to be 
teddy's birthday party. The child was then asked 'What can teddy use the blocks 
for in his birthday party?' (the elicited play condition). If the child exhibited
symbolic play, s/he was scored as showing "elicited" symbolic play, and the 
experimenter moved on to the next item of material. If the child did not exhibit 
symbolic play, the experimenter gave the instructed play condition with the same 
material - 'Show me how teddy could make a table with these blocks’. If the child 
exhibited symbolic play (constructed a table), s/he was scored as showing 
"instructed” symbolic play, and the experimenter moved on to the next item of 
material. If not. the experimenter would give the modelled play condition with the 
same material - 'I shall do it first. Can you copy how I do it?'. If symbolic play 
was produced at this point, the child was scored as having shown modelled play.
In any case, the experimenter moved on to the next item of material. This process 
was continued for each toy in the order listed above, until each of the six had been 
used. Full instructions for the play task can be observed in Appendix 6 .1.
For each item used, the child was also scored for manipulative play. If the child 
showed symbolic play, s/he was credited with manipulative play too, since 
symbolic play entails manipulative play. For example, if a child was able to pretend 
that the blocks were a 'chair' in the elicited condition, "elicited" was recorded for 
both symbolic and manipulative play. On the other hand, if the child used the 
blocks to bang the table in the elicited condition, but did not use them to make a 
table until the modelled condition, "elicited" would be recorded for manipulative 
play, but "modelled" would be recorded for symbolic play.
A rater familiar with the child was recruited from the school staff, and asked to 
observe the session. After the child had been tested for play, the child was taken 
back to the classroom, and the experimenter and the rater filled out the rating scale. 
The rater was not aware of the nature of the scale. One scale was filled out by the 
experimenter and one by the rater, immediately on completion of the symbolic play 
test, for each child tested. This was done in relative silence in an area to which the 
child had no access. The rater received no formal training in the use of the rating
scale, and were only asked lo "indicate how much you agree that each of the 
statements accurately describes the child today". After all the chosen children were 
tested, the rater was thanked and debriefed about the nature of the experiment.
For analysis, symbolic play data were treated in two ways. First, by assigning 
scores reflecting the order: elicited (3 points), instructed (2 points), modelled ( I 
point), no play (0 points). This was necessary for the building of a composite 
symbolic play score for each child. Second, by tallying the frequency of 
occurrence of each of four play categories (elicited, instructed, modelled, no play). 
Thus the range of possible composite scores for symbolic play was between 0 and 
18. Each of the frequency variables (elicited symbolic, instructed symbolic, 
modelled symbolic, and no play) could range between 0 and 6.
As in previous studies, play was judged to be symbolic if the child either (1) 
referred to an absent object or objects. (2) attributed properties to an object which it 
did not have, and/or (3) used an object as if it were another object or objects (c.f. 
Leslie. 1987).
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6.3 Results
Toexamine inter-rater reliability between experimenter and observer ratings of 
affect and attention, intraclass correlation coefficients (ICC 2.2 : Shrout and Reiss. 
1979) were calculated across the 28 subjects. This yielded results of r=0.90 for 
affect and r=0.87 for attention, indicating that the experimenter and observer ratings 
were sufficiently reliable to be averaged and considered as a single measure.
The pattern of symbolic acts can now be considered. Table 6.2 demonstrates the 
results of Mann-Whitney U tests on each category of play (the nonparametric equivalent 
of between-groups one-way analysis of variance: ANOVA analyses may be viewed in 
Appendix 6.2). It will be seen that no significant results were found. The result that 
elicited symbolic play is relatively impaired in children with autism, is not replicated by 
these results. This can also be seen in figure 6 .1. The mean number of instances of no 
response by group, is also shown graphically, in figure 6.2.
Table 6.2 Mann-Whitney U Tests for Group Differences in Play
Van able Mean:
Autistic G ro up
Elicited Ssmbolic Pla\ 3.0
Instructed Symbolic Pla\ 14
Modelled Symbolic Pta\ 0.2
Elicited Sons;,mbolic Pla\ 4.0
Instructed Nonssmbolic Pla> 0.2
Modelled Nons\mbolic Pla\ 0.1
Mean: U  j>
Control Group
3.3 85.0 0.5
1.4 93.0 0.6
0.6 78.0 0.7
4 7  71.0 0.2
0.1 92.0 0.5
0.0 91.0 0.3
0.9Instances of N o Response 1.6 109.5 0.6
As in the study reported in chapter four. Kendall's Tau-B correlations were computed 
to test for relationships between composite symbolic play scores, affect scores and 
attention scores. The results can be observed in table 6.3.
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Table 6.3 By-Group Matrices of Kendall Tau-B Correlations Between Symbolic Play 
Scores, Affect Scores and Attention Scores
Autism Group
Symbolic Play Score Affect Score
Symbolic Play Score 
Affect Score 0.66**
Attention Score 0.42* 0.52**
Control Group
Symbolic Play Score Affect Score
Symbolic Play Score 
Affect Score 0 .41 *
Attention Score ns 0.50*
*p<0.05
**p<0.0l ns = not significant
It will be seen that symbolic play scores and affect scores were highly correlated in both 
groups, as were affect scores and attention scores. However, attention scores were 
only correlated with symbolic play scores in the children with autism. These results 
suggest that perceived affective mood is related to overall symbolic play levels in 
children with and without autism. However, these results suggest that perceived 
attentiveness to tasks is strongly related to symbolic play in children with autism, in a 
way that it is not in children without autism.
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These relationships can be viewed visually by means of scatterplots. Figure 6.3 
demonstrates the relationship between affect scores and attention scores. Figure 6.4 
consists of two plots, one demonstrating the relationship of symbolic play scores to 
affect scores and the other demonstrating the relationship of symbolic play scores to 
attention scores. It can be seen that the symbolic play data is somewhat skewed, and 
this recommends the use of Kendall's Tau correlations. On viewing figure 6.4 it will 
be seen that the lack of any group difference in elicited symbolic play might be due to 
ceiling effects. However, it is also clear that at least the lower half of the distribution is 
present. The use of Kendall's Tau correlations is some protection for the validity of the 
relationships shown in Table 6.3. On the other hand, it does seem that some two or 
three children in the autistic group were bored with the task (low attention), did not 
enjoy it (low affect) and did not do very well (low symbolic play score).
Figure 6.3 The Relationship of Affect and Attention Scores
The open circles and the steeper regression line refer to the autism group, the filled
circles and the less steep regression line to the control group.
Figure 6.4 Plots showing the Relationship of Symbolic Play Scores to Affect 
Scores and Attention Scores
The open circles and the less steep regression line refer to the autism group, the 
filled circles and the steeper regression line to the control group.
The open circles and the steeper regression line refer to the autism group, the filled
circ les and the less steep regression line to the control group.
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6.4 Discussion
In the previous chapter (Chapter five), a rating scale detected between-subject and 
within-subject variation in day-to-day affective mood and attention-to-tasks. in children 
with autism. Using this scale, and a test of symbolic play with non-realistic toys, an 
attempt was made to combine study of symbolic play, affect and attention. Children 
with autism and controls with general intellectual delay were examined. No significant 
group differences in symbolic play were found. However, there were relationships 
between composite symbolic play scores, affect scores and attention scores found in the 
autistic children. In the controls, no relationship between attention scores and 
composite symbolic play scores was found, although affect was significantly related to 
symbolic play.
The results comprise some evidence of a relationship between affect and symbolic play, 
and further support for the idea that the relationships between affect, symbolic play and 
attention might be more related in children with autism (c.f. Ozonoff et al., 1991).
How ever, there are difficulties in choosing between the metarepresentational and 
interpersonal approaches. Although affect was related to symbolic play in both groups, 
no symbolic play impairment was found in the autistic children, which is not consistent 
with the literature (e.g. Lewis and Boucher, 1995). This casts considerable doubt on 
the reliability of the data. Therefore we need to be cautious about seeing the 
correlations as evidence of superiority of the interpersonal approach.
The lack of a symbolic play impairment may have been due to the ceiling effect which 
was observed in the distribution of symbolic play score. The ceiling effect might be 
addressed in a future study by the use of less linguistically able subjects.
A major difference between the study presented in chapter four and the present study 
was the choice of control group. Hobson (1991b) points out that it is important to
I l l
avoid the confounding effect of general intellectual delay, when trying to identify 
autism-specific impaimients. It may be that some of the impairment identified in 
chapter four was due to such delay.
The relationships between affect, attention and symbolic play in the children with 
autism confirmed those reported in chapter four. A notable result was the significant 
relationship between attention scores and composite symbolic play scores which was 
specific to the children with autism, it is not a new suggestion that autism is a disorder 
of attention (e.g. Dawson and I^ewy, 1989). However this does not help us choose 
between the two theories because of the suspicious nature of the data.
Bearing in mind the need for less able subjects, we might also require a new 
perspective on affect and attention which is less dependent on the subjective perceptions 
of raters - which is actually as much about the observer as the observed. Reliability 
was acceptable, but it is less clear about what was rated - it may simply have been the 
co-operativeness of the child. On the other hand there was evidence of face validity in 
chapter3. We might look at other measures of affect and attention and see if the same 
relationships with symbolic play emerge.
A highly specific hypothesis can now be proposed, to test the interpersonal relatedncss 
account of symbolic play. The amount of attention directed at the experimenter's face 
during a test of symbolic play should be less than that of controls, if the theory is 
correct. The rationale for this is that symbolic play tests arc good examples of potential 
'relatedness triangles' (c.f. Hobson, 1993). In children with autism, an important part 
of interpersonal relatedness, attunement to the facial expression of the other, should be 
missing within such a relatedness triangle. This suggestion shall form the basis of the 
final empirical study of this thesis (Chapter seven).
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Two aims can be set forward for this final empirical study. First, an attempt should be 
made to replicate the finding that symbolic generati vity. inherent in elicited symbolic 
play, is not impaired in children with autism. Second, to confirm whether an 
interpersonal relatedness account of symbolic play in autism can be made, the attention 
of children with autism to the facial expression of the experimenter should be 
examined, during a test of symbolic play. This might confirm whether such a situation 
is a form of 'relatedness triangle' itself.
Chapter 7
The Symbolic Play Test as a 'Relatedness Triangle'; the Importance 
of Social Attention in Autism
7.1 Introduction
In the previous study (chapter six) it was shown that the social attention of children 
w ith autism is different from that of controls. Symbolic play scores were correlated 
w ith perceived attention-to-tasks, only in the children with autism, not in the 
controls. However because there was a lack of any symbolic play impairment in 
the autistic children it was concluded that the data should be viewed with caution.
Two objectives were suggested at the end of chapter six for the present study.
First, it was seen to be important to test again the suggestion of l>ewis and Boucher
(1995) that the symbolic play of children with autism reflects poor generativity. 
Inconsistent results have been found so far. In chapter four, the children with 
autism demonstrated significantly poorer symbolic generativity than controls, but in 
chapter six. this finding was not replicated. This may have been due to ceiling 
effects in the symbolic play data. Also, the symbolic play tests used were different; 
six items in the latter study (chapter six), with eight items in the former study 
(chapter four).
In addition, the study reported in chapter six included control participants who were 
more comparable to children with autism, than the controls of the study reported in 
chapter four. The controls in chapter six did not have autism but had general 
intellectual delay. The controls in chapter four were younger children in 
mainstreamed schools. Furthermore, 'realistic' toys were used in the former study, 
but not in the latter study. This type of toy invites theoretical confusion between
symbolic play and 'functional' play. Authors currently disagree upon this issue 
(c.f. L.ewis and Boucher, 1988).
However it was suspected that the most likely explanation for the lack of group 
difference in symbolic generativity in the previous study, was that the children's 
relatively high receptive language ability led to a ceiling effect. Therefore, the 
groups in the present study were very closely matched for both receptive and 
expressive language ability, and less able children were selected.
The main aim of the present study is to examine the symbolic play test as a 
'relatedness triangle'. It is hoped that this will clarify whether the interpersonal 
relatedness approach can be applied to the symbolic play situation itself. Hobson 
(1993) suggested that this situation includes important elements of primary 
intersubjectivity (interpersonal relations) which are important for the development 
of secondary intersubjectivity (e.g symbolic behaviours). With this in mind, the 
specific hypothesis is that the children with autism will demonstrate poor attention 
to the facial expression of the experimenter.
If the amount of attention directed to the experimenter is less in the children with 
autism than in the controls, and a symbolic impairment is found, then it will be 
possible to view the symbolic play test not only as a test of symbolic acts, but also 
as a test of interpersonal relatedness itself. Although this does not necessarily 
exclude metarepresentational approaches when attempting to explain symbolic play 
and autism, it highlights the inclusive nature of the interpersonal relatedness 
metaphor, and the narrow focus of l^slie's (1987) original thesis on computational 
cognition.
In 1.4.4 studies by Mundy, Sigman and colleagues were discussed (Mundy, 
Sigman and Kasari. 1990; Mundy, Sigman. lingerer and Sherman, 1986, 1987;
Sigman. Mundy. Sherman and Ungerer. 1986) which examined 'referential 
looking' during tests of 'joint-attention' in young children with autism. It was 
found consistently across these studies that children with autism demonstrated 
significantly fewer looks towards the experimenter's face, when both the 
experimenter and the child were engaged with a toy. In contrast, eye contact 
between child and experimenter was relatively common if the child was engaged in 
a 'physical' tickling game, and when the child needed to gain the aid of the 
experimenter when the toy was out of reach.
It can be argued that the potentially symbolic referent (the toy), the experimenter 
and the child comprised a 'relatedness triangle' which was relatively poorly formed 
in the children with autism. The tickling-type game did not have the element of the 
symbolic referent (the toy), and the requesting behaviour was purely to gain the 
toy. The requesting behaviour only required the perception of the experimenter's 
physical (or possibly visual) perspective on the toy, not their mental perspective.
The joint engagement with the toy, on the other hand, invited perception of the 
experimenter's attitude towards the toy, and hence the potential for symbolic play. 
Bear in mind that interpersonal relatedness is, in this approach, a prerequisite for 
symbolic behaviour. However, symbolic play was not the focus of the studies by 
Mundy. Sigman and colleagues.
The present study seeks to extend the findings of previous studies by examining 
symbolic play and social attention on three separate occasions. Because of this, 
methodological changes to the play test are necessary to avoid effects of exposure to 
the procedure.
7.2 Method
Participcvus. Ten children with autism and 10 controls with general intellectual 
delay were selected from local special schools. The children had all been used in 
the previous study, but there was a long gap between the studies (some four 
months). The autistic children had received psychiatric diagnosis of autism (DSM- 
Ill-R; APA, 1987). Table 7.1 details their gender, chronological ages, receptive 
language age equivalences and expressive language scores. The present design 
included repeated measures of symbolic play, manipulative play, attention and 
affect. The children were seen on three occasions. On the first occasion receptive 
language was assessed by the Test for the Reception of Grammar (TROG; Bishop, 
1983) and on the second occasion, expressive language was assessed by the 
Renfrew Action Picture Test (APT; Renfrew, 1966). On all three occasions, 
subjects were given the play task and were videotaped in order to assess their social 
attention.
In line with the methodological conclusions reached in 6.4, these groups were very 
closely matched and chosen for relatively low receptive language age equivalence, 
expressive language scores, and chronological age. This entailed the exclusion of 
four participants, two from each group, to ensure close compatibility of the groups, 
in spite of the otherwise appropriate linguistic abilities of these children. These 
exclusions were in addition to those children excluded because their receptive 
language age equivalence fell lower than the range detected by the TROG.
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Table 7.1 Gender, chronological age, receptive language age equivalence and 
expressive language scores
Gender CA TRCX) Renfrew
GirlsiBoys Information Grammar
Autism 2 :8 Mean 8.1 4.6 23.4 12.3
3 II o SD 1.0 0.9 6.6 5.7
Controls 3 : 7 Mean 8.6 4.7 22.0 15.3
(n=10) SD 0.8 0.8 5.4 6.4
Independent Factors Group
Occasion
Dependent Factors Symbolic Play -elicited
- instructed
- modelled
- no play
- composite score
Seconds attending to experimenter
Materials. A Video Camera (JVC), Recorder (Panasonic) and tripod were used to 
record the children playing on each occasion. The children were presented with a 
teddy on all occasions, with a set of two additional non-realistic toys; either ( I) a set 
of blocks and a piece of tubular plastic, (2) a piece of rubber and some felt, or (3) a 
short stick and some playdough. The toy items were presented in twos to allow for 
a procedure which included counterbalancing. None of the children indicated 
distress at the presence of the video, but some who were interested were allowed to 
view themselves through the viewfinder after they had completed the procedure on 
the third occasion.
Procedure. On each occasion the children were shown the teddy. The 
experimenter said, "What can teddy do with this / these?" and showed the child the 
first toy (elicited symbolic play being potentiated). If the child played with the toy. 
either symbolically, or non-symbolically, this was recorded. If symbolic play was 
recorded, the experimenter said "What else can teddy do with this / these?" 
beginning the procedure again. If symbolic play was not recorded, the 
experimenter instructed symbolic play; for example. "Show me how teddy could 
build a table with these blocks." If symbolic play was recorded at this stage, the 
experimenter said "What else can teddy do with this / these?", beginning the 
procedure over. If symbolic play was not recorded at this stage, the experimenter 
modelled symbolic play, saying "I shall do it first. Can you copy how I do it?". 
Whether or not symbolic play was recorded at this stage the experimenter said 
"what else can teddy do with these?", beginning the procedure over. Full 
instructions can be seen in Appendix 7 .1.
This procedure was repeated until either the child had demonstrated symbolic play 
with the toy three times, or the experimenter had failed to elicit modelled symbolic 
play after the third attempt to elicit symbolic play with the second toy. Then the 
entire procedure was repeated for the second toy item. The theoretical range of 
symbolic acts was 0-6 (a maximum of six acts of symbolic play on elicitation, three 
for each toy).
The experimenter tallied the frequency of occurrence of each of four play categories 
(elicited, instructed, modelled, no play). The data on non-symbolic play were also 
tallied. For the purposes of correlations, composite scores were built from these 
frequencies as in previous studies (3 for elicited play, 2 for instructed play. I for 
modelled play). Thus the range of possible scores for symbolic and manipulative 
play was between 0 and 18.
Social attention was examined by means of a video recording of the play sessions.
A thirty-second sample, of the number of seconds the child looked at the 
experimenter's face, began after the second attempt by the experimenter to elicit 
symbolic play. The second attempt at elicitation was chosen in preference to the 
first to avoid primacy effects. Measurements were taken to the nearest half-second.
A number of additional background variables were included for further information. 
These were the number of smiles shown in each sample, the number of seconds 
spent smiling, the number of seconds spent looking at the toy, and the number of 
seconds spent looking at neither the toy nor the experimenter.
7.3 Results
The first results to be considered were the differences between the groups in play. 
Table 7.2 demonstrates the results of within-occasion Mann-Whitney U tests for 
group differences in play. It will be seen that the only significant difference was in 
elicited non-symbolic (functional and manipulative) play, on the third occasion, 
with more of this type of play being demonstrated by the children with autism. 
These results do not support the findings of chapter four, that symbolic generativity 
is specifically impaired in children with autism.
The next results to be considered were group differences in social attention. It was 
not considered necessary to test this measure for reliability, as it is based upon 
actual full half-seconds of directed gaze rather than estimation of'state' by raters 
(although with hindsight it would have strengthened objectivity of the measure). 
Table 73 shows the results of within-occasion Mann-Whitney U tests for group 
differences in the number of seconds spent looking at the experimenter's face. 
Background variables are included which reflect the child's affect (number of 
smiles, number of seconds smiling) and attention not directed at the experimenter 
(number of seconds attending to toy, number of seconds attending to neither the toy 
nor the other).
It will be seen that on the first occasion, the groups were not significantly different 
from each other in any variable. However, on the second occasion, the children 
with autism demonstrated fewer smiles than the controls, and spent fewer seconds 
smiling. Most importantly for this study they spent significantly less time looking 
at the experimenter. On the third occasion, the children with autism spent fewer 
seconds smiling, and spent more time looking at neither the experimenter nor the 
toy, than controls. Again, they spent less time looking at the experimenter. These 
results suggest that there is an impairment in social attention (and affect) in children 
with autism, although this need not be apparent in an initial symbolic play situation 
(i.e. on the first occasion).
Table 7.2 Mann-Whitney U tests for Group Differences in Play on Each Occasion
(k x a s io n  I
Variable Mean: Autism Mean: Control U E
Elicited Symbolic Play 1.7 2.0 39.5 0.4
Instructed Symbolic Play 1.9 2.1 47.5 0.8
Modelled Symbolic Pla\ 0.4 0.4 58.0 0.5
Elicited Nonsvmbolic Pla\ 0.9 0.6 60.5 0.4
Instructed Nonsvmbolic Pla\ 0.4 0.3 51.0 0.9
Modelled Nonsvmbolic Pla\ 0.1 0.1 50.0 1.0
Instances of No Response 0.6 0.6 46.0 0.7
O c c a s io n  2
Variable Mean: Autism Mean: Control U £
Elicited Symbolic Pla\ 2.0 2.7 37.5 0.3
Instructed Symbolic Play l . l 1.8 36.0 0.3
Modelled Symbolic Play 0.4 0.5 53.0 0.8
Elicited Nonsymbolic Plav 0.8 0.4 61.0 0.4
Instructed Nonsvmbolic Play 0.5 0.2 61.0 0.3
Modelled Nonsymbol ic Plav 0 .0 0.0 50.0 1.0
Instances of No Response 1.2 0.4 70.0 0.1
O c c a s io n  3
Variable Mean: Autism Mean: Control u £
Elicited Symbolic Pla\ 1.9 2.6 40.0 0.4
Instructed Symbolic Play 1.0 2.1 33.5 0.2
Modelled Symbolic Play 0.7 0.2 62.0 0.3
Elicited Nonsvmbolic Play 1.0 0.1 80.5 <0.01
Instructed Nonsvmbolic Play 0.2 0.3 50.0 1.0
Modelled Nonsvmbolic Plav 0.5 0.1 65.5 0.1
Instances of No Response 0.7 0.4 59.0 0.4
A l l  O c c a s io n s
Variable Mean: Autism Mean: Control U E
Elicited Symbolic Play 5.6 7.3 35.0 0.2
Instructed Symbolic Play 4.0 6.0 34.0 0.2
Modelled Symbolic Play 1.5 i l 61.0 0.4
Elicited Nonsymbolic Flay 2.7 i i 74.5 0.1
Instructed Nonsvmbolic Play l . l 0.8 62.5 0.3
Modelled Nonsymbolic Play 0.6 0.2 53.0 0.8
Instances of No Response 2.5 1.4 67.0 0.2
NB ANOVA analyses were also carried out (see Appendix 7.3).
Table 7.3 Mann-Whitney U Tests for Group Differences in Number of Seconds 
Attending to the Experimenter, and Background Affective and Attentive 
Variables, on Each Occasion
O c c a s io n  1
Variable Mean: Autism  Mean: Control U E
No. of Seconds Attending
to Experimenter 12.9 13.9 46.0 0.8
Background Vanablcs:
No. of Smiles 66.0 0.2
Seconds Smiling 42.5 0.6
Seconds Attending to To y 46.0 0.8
Seconds Attending Elsewhere 63.0 0.3
O c c a s io n  2
Variable Mean: Autism  Mean: Control U E
No. of Seconds Attending
to Experimenter 6.7 14.6 12.5 <0.01
Background Variables:
No. of Smiles 20.5 <0.03
Seconds Smiling 16.0 <0.02
Seconds Attending to T on 46.0 0.8
Seconds Attending El sew here 73.0 0.1
O c c a s io n  3
Variable Mean: Autism  Mean: Control U E
No. of Seconds Attending
to Experimenter 6.1 14.1 18.0 <0.02
Background Variables:
No. of Smiles 33.5 0.2
Seconds Smiling 12.0 <0.01
Seconds Attending to To y 28.5 0.1
Seconds Attending Elsewhere 84.5 <0.01
A l l  O c c a s io n s
Variable Mean: Autism  Mean: Control y E
No. ot Seconds Attending 
to Experimenter 25.7 42.6 18.0 <0.02
A ll Background Variables ns across all occasions
NB ANOVA analyses were also carried out (sec Appendix 7.3).
A series of Friedman Tests were carried out within-groups. to test for the effects of 
occasion on each variable. Flowever. none of these test results were significant. 
These particular results may be viewed in Appendix 7.2. Flowever. it is clear that 
group differences were not so marked on the first occasion, since group differences 
were not significant.
It is important to consider the symbolic play data in relation to the number of 
seconds spent looking at the experimenter. Figure 7 .1 shows the number of 
seconds spent engaged in this behaviour, by occasion and group. Figures 7.2, 7.3 
and 7.4 demonstrate the mean number of acts of elicited symbolic play, instructed 
symbolic play, and modelled symbolic play, by group. Each of these last three 
figures represents a single occasion.
Figure 7.2 Mean Number of Symbolic Play Acts by Category & Group; Occasion 1
I
I
elicited instructed modelled
■  children with autism 
H  controls
By-group Kendall's Tau-B correlations were computed for each occasion, between 
composite symbolic play scores and the number of seconds spent looking at the 
experimenter. No significant relationships were observed.
In sum, the children with autism did not demonstrate significantly less elicited, 
instructed and modelled symbolic play than controls. However, in a symbolic play 
situation they demonstrated less attention to the experimenter after the first 
occasion. There were no significant correlations between symbolic play and 
attention directed to the experimenter.
7.4 Discussion
This study complements the findings of previous studies in two main ways. First, 
no significant group differences in the elicited symbolic play of children with autism 
and controls were found. Second, in line with studies of joint-attention behaviours, 
the children with autism were found to look at the experimenter less often than 
controls in the symbolic play test situation, in two out of three occasions. These 
findings shall be considered in turn.
In previous studies the elicited symbolic play of children with autism has been 
poorer than controls (for a review, see Jarrold. Boucher and Smith, 1993). In this 
respect the findings of the present study are peculiar. However, if we view figures 
7.2, 7.3 and 7.4 we can see that group differences in means were more marked on 
the second and third occasions. A generativity impairment was supported by the 
findings of chapter four, but not by those of chapter six, where there was a ceiling 
effect. An important difference between those studies was the inclusion of younger 
mainstreamed controls in the former, and the inclusion of controls without autism 
who had general intellectual delay, in the latter.
A generativity impairment was identified when children with autism were compared 
with chronologically younger mainstreamed children. It was not identified when 
comparison was made with children without autism who had general intellectual 
delay. The groups of children included in the present study are very close in 
receptive and expressive language ability, and in the present study both groups 
were less able in linguistic ability than the groups described in Chapter 6.
The issues regarding appropriate controls have borne out the review of 
methodological issues in the study of emotion perception in autism, by Hobson 
(1991b). It is possible that general delay is at the heart of any symbolic generativity
impairment, on the basis of the present results (although the findings of Lewis and 
Boucher, 1995, contest this). Possibly, a phenomenon of a continuum of 'specific' 
and 'general' delays blurs the issue.
A final issue in the findings regarding symbolic play is the lack of use of realistic 
toys in both the present study and the previous study. It is possible that these 
studies are 'blunted' to a generativity impairment because non-realistic toys are 
inherently more difficult to use as symbolic toys. This would not seem likely, 
given that Lewis and Boucher (1988) reported that non-realistic toys invited more 
symbolic play than realistic toys, which themselves invite functional non-symbolic 
play.
The central hypothesis of the study was that a symbolic play impairment would 
correspond to an impairment in social attention. The results do not support this 
hypothesis because (1) the study did not detect a symbolic play impairment, and (2) 
because there was no relationship between composite symbolic play score and the 
number of seconds spent looking at the experimenter. Therefore, this study failed 
to demonstrate that a non-spontaneous symbolic play situation can be viewed as a 
'relatedness triangle'.
The studies presented in the thesis have failed to be convincing about the role of 
attentional and affective factors in symbolic play. There are two alternative 
possibilities why this is the case. First, it is possible that the studies were 
methodologically flawed. Jarrold et al. (1993) point out that many studies of 
symbolic play in autism can be criticised on methodological grounds, and certainly 
many of the methodological issues apply to the studies presented here. Especially 
suspicious is the lack of any symbolic play impairment in the autistic children.
These issues shall be further explored in the following general discussion chapter.
Second, it may be that affective / attentive factors are not central to the failure of 
autistic children to play in symbolic ways. Leslie and Frith (1990) suggest that any 
affective disorder which can be observed in autistic children is secondary to their 
cognitive impairments. This remains a strong possibility.
Chapter 8
General Discussion
There will be two main themes in this general discussion chapter. First, it is 
important to clarify and explore the methodological issues of the empirical studies, 
in order to evaluate their contribution to current research into symbolic play and 
autism. Second, with these methodological issues in mind, it is hoped that a 
number of theoretical implications will be apparent. These theoretical implications 
will be drawn from both other research and theory, and the findings of the empirical 
studies.
8.1 Empirical Findings in Brief
In chapter two, a preliminary study examined the effect of a musical stimulus on the 
symbolic play of preschool children. An effect of the music was found; the 
children demonstrated more elicited symbolic play when a musical stimulus was 
included.
Chapter three traced the development of a rating scale designed to measure affective 
mood and attention-to-tasks. Adequate face validity was estimated, and the scale 
piloted during the study reported in chapter two. Flowever. results were limited by 
the fact that there was only a single rater.
The following study (chapter four) examined the effect of a musical stimulus on the 
symbolic play of children with autism, and that of younger children from 
mainstream education. The groups were comparable in terms of their receptive 
language ability. Although an effect of the musical stimulus was found in the 
elicited symbolic play of the controls, no such effect was found in the children with
autism. However, no interaction between group and condition was found using 
ANOVA analyses (c.f. Appendix 4.2). It was concluded that the evidence that 
music had an effect specific to the control group was limited.
With the effect of a musical stimulus replicated in the control subjects of this study, 
it was then possible to examine relationships of affective mood, symbolic play, and 
attention to tasks. Significant relationships between composite symbolic play 
scores and attention scores, and symbolic play scores and affect scores, were only 
observed in the children with autism. These relationships may be analogous to the 
relationships between emotion perception and theory of mind ability, suggested by 
Ozonoff, Pennington and Rogers (1991).
However, relatedness between individuals is a spontaneous phenomenon. The 
procedures of the studies reported in Chapters 2 and 4 may have seemed unnatural 
to the children. Because of this, it was seen to be important to examine whether 
these relationships would be found when symbolic play, affect and attention were 
allowed to vary naturally. However, it was unclear whether the rating scale 
developed to measure affective mood and attention-to-tasks was sensitive enough to 
detect such variation. A preliminary study (Chapter 5) involved the measurement of 
affective mood and attention-to-tasks in children with autism across three 
occasions, using the scale. Enough natural variation in affect and attention was 
detected by the rating scale to warrant further investigation of these relationships. 
This variation was observed both within-participants and between-participants.
The next study examined the relationships of affective mood, attention-to-tasks, and 
symbolic play in children with autism (Chapter6). Significant relationships 
between composite symbolic play scores, affect scores and attention scores were 
found in the children with autism. In the controls, a relationship was found 
between composite symbolic play scores and affect scores, but no relationship
between attention scores and composite symbolic play scores was found.
However, these controls were children without autism who had general intellectual 
delay, not children in mainstreamed education. Because no symbolic play 
impairment was found in the autistic children is this study, the results were not 
conclusive evidence of the role of affect and attention in symbolic play in autism.
In the final study of this thesis (Chapter 7) the symbolic play test itself was 
proposed as an example of the 'relatedness triangle'. In this triangle, children with 
autism were hypothesised to (1) attend less to the adult with whom they are 
playing, and (2) demonstrate a symbolic play impairment. Although the children 
with autism looked at the experimenter's face significantly less than the controls, no 
symbolic play impairment was found. It was concluded that without corresponding 
symbolic play and social attention impairments, that the concept of a 'symbolic play 
relatedness triangle' could not be accepted on the basis of these results.
In relation to the examination of symbolic play, a number of methodological issues 
are apparent. First, there was a different control group (the controls in the latter 
study were more comparable to children with autism) from chapter 6 onward. 
Second, there were fewer test items and all items involved non-realistic toys in the 
study reported in chapter six than previously. Third, a ceiling effect was observed 
in chapter 6.
In the final study (Chapter 7) no differences were found in the symbolic play of 
children with autism and that of controls. Furthermore, although it might be argued 
that symbolic play scores approached ceiling in Chapter 6, this was certainly not the 
case in Chapter 7. Therefore, the question of whether autism involves an 
impairment in symbolic nenerutivity or an impairment in symbolic play ability per se 
remains unclear. Contrary to studies such as that of l.ewis and Boucher (1995) the
children with autism were not less able to generate symbolic ideas than children 
with general intellectual delay and no autism.
8.2 Methodological Issues
The nature of the measurements of symbolic play, as well as the measurements of 
affective mood, attention-to-tasks and social attention in the final study (Chapter 7), 
require careful consideration as methodological issues.
8.2.1 On the Nature of the Symbolic Play Measurements
The symbolic play tests were based on Leslie's ( 1987) categories as outlined in 1.2, 
for categorisation of a 'symbolic act'. The tests were based on the study by Lewis 
and Boucher ( 1988) for their structure. Lewis and Boucher ( 1988) suggested that 
impairments in spontaneous symbolic play could be either cognitive impairments or 
conative impairments. Because of this, the tests included in the present thesis were 
designed to examine three types of non-spontaneous symbolic play; elicited 
symbolic play, instructed symbolic play, and modelled symbolic play.
However, the inclusion of spontaneous symbolic play may have shown interesting 
contrasts between the children with autism and controls. For example, would the 
increase in the symbolic play of children with autism, brought about by instructions 
or elicitation, be linear in relation to that of controls? Or would the increase be more 
or less dramatic? Other research can answer these questions to some degree. 
Jarrold, Boucher and Smith ( 1991 ) demonstrated a parallel increase in symbolic 
play in children with autism on the inclusion of elicitation and instructions, relative 
to controls.
A further issue concerns modelled symbolic play. Baron-Cohen (1987) pointed out 
that modelled play is little more than physical imitation. However, very little of the 
symbolic play demonstrated in this thesis followed modelling by the experimenter. 
The meaningful comparisons have been made between elicited symbolic play and 
instructed symbolic play, since it was important to address symbolic generativity.
It is also important to point out that other key studies of symbolic play actually 
included conditions entirely consisting of particular categories of symbolic play 
(e.g. Jarrold, Boucher and Smith, 1991; Lewis and Boucher, 1988). This 
approach to the measurement of symbolic play enjoys the advantage of avoiding the 
exclusion of play which is relatively uncommon in less structured situations, such 
as modelled play.
The reader must also bear in mind that the studies differed in terms of the number of 
toy items used. The first and second symbolic play studies (Chapters 2 and 4) 
included four realistic and four unrealistic toys. However, to avoid confusion with 
functional play, realistic toys were not used as test items in the later studies 
(Chapters 6 and 7). Also, in the final study (Chapter 7) toys were used in twos, 
three times over, in order to allow for counterbalancing. The results of the studies 
are still comparable, but they could have been more so with greater methodological 
consistency.
A very important issue is the lack of reliability testing of the symbolic play data. 
This seriously impairs the value of the findings. Future studies should include 
measurement of symbolic play by independent raters whose data is then tested for 
reliability. The affect and attention measures of Chapter 7 could be treated in the 
same way in future studies.
In sum, these studies suffer from considerable methodological problems as regards 
the data on symbolic play. Therefore, they should be treated with caution especially 
when comparisons are made between them. With hindsight, greater methodological 
consistency, and the inclusion of a spontaneous component to the play, may have 
produced results more consistent with current research (for a review of 
methodological issues in symbolic play research in autism, see Jarrold, Boucher 
and Smith, 1993).
8.2.2 On the Nature of the Affective Mood / Attention-to-tasks Rating Scale
The methodological issues concerning the use of the rating scale developed in 
Chapter 3 and used in Chapters 4, 5 and 6 should also be examined. The rating 
scale was originally conceived to address the anecdotal evidence of professionals 
(teachers and educational assistants) that mood and attention varied from day to day 
in children with autism. This was borne out in Chapter 5, although variation also 
differed between children. The scale was especially useful in detecting a 
relationship between symbolic play scores and rated attention-to-tasks in the 
children with autism.
The major qualification of the scale is that it addressed only very specific forms of 
affect and attention, and then only from the perspective of others on the child. As 
such, it only really measured the affect and attention which others could perceive. 
On the other hand, the other is a very important element of the relatedness triangle, 
and it is of course problematic to ask children with autism to report how they are 
feeling.
We can say that the scale was useful in that it examined the perceptions of important 
'lay experts'; the professionals who care for children with autism (Chapters 5 and 
6). It was also used successfully by raters unfamiliar with autism (Chapter 4). It
would also be interesting to examine the perceptions of other important individuals 
such as parents and siblings.
8.2.3 On the Nature of the Measure of Social Attention
The measure of social attention, or more specifically, 'referential looking', enjoys a 
relative objectivity when compared with the rating scale. Whilst not being 
completely objective (lacking precision beyond half-seconds) these results can be 
considered robust. They are also very comparable to the findings of previous 
studies of joint-attention behaviours, studies which also included play (e.g. Mundy, 
Sigman and Kasari. 1990; Mundy, Sigman, Ungerer and Sherman, 1986, 1987; 
Sigman, Mundy, Sherman and Ungerer, 1986).
8.2.4 On the Choice of language Tests
It was important to assess the language of the children carefully. Recently it has 
become clear that the vocabulary of children with autism can far exceed their 
grammatical understanding of language and comprehension of meaning (c.f.
Jarrold. Boucher and Smith, 1993). Certain tests such as the British Picture 
Vocabulary Scale (BPVS) are problematic for this reason.
The Test for the Reception of Grammar (TROG; Bishop, 1983)was useful because 
it does not require vocalisation by the subject in order to answer. It simply requires 
the ability to point at the correct picture out of four presented, which matches a 
statement made by the tester. Thus, TROG measures a person's receptive language 
ability.
For the purposes of perspective, the Renfrew Action Picture Test (Renfrew, 1966) 
was also administered in the studies reported in chapter six and seven, in order to
test expressive language ability. This test includes two scores, one being 
constructed from the child's demonstration of vocabulary, the other from the correct 
use of grammar. These scores should be considered secondary to the receptive 
language age equivalences suggested by TROG. They are useful because they 
demonstrate that the children with autism did not differ significantly from the 
controls' expressive language scores.
8.2.5 Other Methodological Issues
Some work was carried out with the intention of inclusion in this thesis, which 
could not be included in the event. A further chapter was to be included which 
described a further analysis of the final study. The chapter was to entail a re­
analysis of the videotapes of the symbolic play sessions reported in Chapter 7. In 
this re-analysis, independent raters marked the sessions 1-2-3 in terms of the 
child's 'positive affective mood' and 'attention to the task and experimenter', with 1 
being the session where they showed the most of each quality, and 3 being the 
session where they showed the least of each quality. Unfortunately, inter-rater 
reliability was too poor to include the results in the thesis. This work had been very 
labour-intensive. It required many hours of careful video editing for 
counterbalancing of presentation of the different occasions to the raters. It also 
included recruitment and organisation of payment of the raters, as well as the rating 
itself. Four months were spent engaged in this work, which in the end could not be 
included. It was the single most time-consuming study of the thesis.
Furthermore, the poor inter-rater reliability of this unreported study might cast 
doubt on the validity of the earlier rating scale. Reliability was generally 
satisfactory, but it may be that another phenomenon than affect or attention was 
measured, such as co-operativeness. On the other hand the findings of chapter 3 
would stand against this.
There is also a current issue in the diagnosis of autism, which may be relevant. In 
the autistic children included in this thesis, all of the children had received a formal 
Statement of Special Educational Needs including some mention of autism, with 
psychiatric advice indicating autistic features consistent with DSM-UIR (APA,
1987) criteria. The children were seen in the Birmingham and Stoke-on-Trent areas 
of the UK, where Local Authority practice involves the provision of specialist 
provision for autistic children. However many Local Authorities do not accept that 
autistic children require specialist provision, and instead aim to integrate these 
children rather than place them in autistic schools (as in Birmingham) or in autistic 
units within special schooling (as in Stoke). Authorities aiming for integration are 
less concerned about whether psychiatric diagnosis is or is not made. It is beyond 
the aims of this thesis to attempt to resolve the question about diagnosis of autism, 
except to say that the children examined had received such a diagnosis.
A final methodological issue is the loss of subjects through the use of language 
tests. Although at least ten children with autism were included in each of the 
studies, six were lost from the study reported in Chapter 4, four were lost in the 
study reported in Chapter 6 and eight were lost in the study reported in Chapter 7 
(and two more to ensure close compatibility of the groups). In each case, children 
were at first recommended by their teachers as 'at about the four year level in 
receptive language', but on completion of the TROG the children did not reach four 
years' age equivalence. This may have been due to their unrepresentative 
competence in vocabulary, which has already been mentioned in 8.2.4.
8.3 Theoretical Implications of the Studies
Now that methodological considerations of the empirical studies have been 
clarified, it is possible to outline their theoretical implications, and how these relate 
to other research. It will be seen that the findings of this thesis are limited by the 
methodological issues described above.
The evidence of a social-affective-attentive disorder in autism presented in this 
thesis is unconvincing. A musical stimulus was found to influence the symbolic 
play of children without autism by increasing the number of symbolic responses 
overall, and increasing the number of generative symbolic responses. It was 
argued that a perception of the social significance of the musical stimulus could 
account for these results. This finding is also interesting because it was not found 
in the children with autism in chapter four.
Affective mood and attention-to-tasks correlated with the composite symbolic play 
scores of the children with autism in both chapter 4 and chapter 6. This might 
indicate a degree of interdependence of these factors in children with autism. 
However as evidence of affective and attentive factors in symbolic play, these 
results are compromised by the lack of a corresponding symbolic play impairment 
in chapter 6.
In chapter 7 there were fewer instances of 'referential looking' in children with 
autism than in controls. This result is in line with those reported in studies of joint- 
attention carried out by Mundy, Sigman and colleagues. Again however, the result 
is compromised by a lack of a corresponding symbolic play impairment. 
Furthermore, no relationships were found between the 'referential looking' variable 
and composite symbolic play score.
Therefore only very limited evidence was found to support the introduction of 
affective and attentive factors into models of symbolic play in autism. The original 
questions posited at the beginning of the thesis were:
• Can music influence symbolic play-and is this different in autism ?
There was some evidence that music can influence symbolic play. However, there 
was a lack of statistical interaction between condition and group in chapter 4, and so 
the evidence that autistic children are different in this regard is tenuous.
• Do certain affective / attentive variables relate to symbolic play differently in 
autistic and non-autistic children ?
This question could not be adequately answered because of the failure to detect 
corresponding symbolic play impairments in chapter 6 (and chapter 7). However, 
some evidence was found to suggest that affect and attention might be related to 
symbolic play in children with autism - but this did not comprise evidence that we 
should adopt an interpersonal approach to autism.
• Are specific kinds of non-spontaneous play specifically impaired in autism?
The evidence fora generativity impairment was poor; it was only observed in 
chapter 4. It was not seen in chapters 6 and 7. The question could not be 
adequately answered, although other research suggests that a generativity 
impairment does indeed exist in autism5 (Lewis and Boucher, 1995, 1988).
5 Lewis and  Boucher (1995) report that som e of th e  generativ ity  
im pairm ent can be overcom e to some ex ten t using a  single toy and  non- 
rep resen ta tional m aterial. T herefore even  generativ ity  im pairm ent 
may involve m ore than ab ility .
• Is there less referential looking from child to experimenter in children with autism 
while they are playing with him?
There was no evidence of corresponding symbolic play and social attention 
impairments in chapter 7, although the children with autism did look at the 
experimenter less often than the controls on two out of three occasions. If social 
attention and symbolic play are necessarily linked, why would one be impaired and 
the other not?
8.4 Overall Implications for the Theories
Given the unconvincing results of the empirical studies, which theory should we 
adopt in explaining the symbolic play of autistic children? As we saw in 1.8 and 
1.9. there is uncomfortable evidence for both. As far as the metarepresentational 
theory is concerned, why should blind children show autistic features, why should 
structuring symbolic play improve it when it supposed to be cognitively impaired, 
and why does mental state understanding not improve in this way? As far as the 
interpersonal relatedness concept is concerned, why should results about emotion 
perception be ambiguous, and why should the basic impairment of autism not be 
cognitive, as Baron-Cohen (1994) has proposed?
Nevertheless, a strength of the theory of mind approach is that there is an ever 
growing body of evidence that understanding of mental states is very poor in 
children with autism, and this docs seem to constitute a specific delay - in ability. 
There have not been any studies showing that knowledge of mental slates can be 
effectively taught to autistic people. Hven if we accept Pemer'st 1993) advice and 
do not include symbolic play in truly metarepresentational abilities, there is more 
than enough research to support a theory of mind impairment in autism.
Similarly, Hobson's approach, summarised in Hobson (1993) enjoys enough 
support from various research programmes to continue at least for the moment as a 
separate research programme. There are simply too many authors, not necessarily 
communicating with each other, suggesting that relatedness of one form or another 
contributes to symbolic development - particularly, the evidence from 
communication therapy, blind children, and the ability of autistic people to shift 
between vision and audition.
The research has not stayed static. Possibly under the pressure of alternative views 
such as those of Tantam (1992) and Rogers and Pennington (1991), Baron- 
Cohen's model o f the mindreading system (1994) is in fact an integrative effort. It 
contains parallel systems, any of which might result in autism if damaged. The 
ToMM (Theory of Mind Mechanism), SAM (Shared Attention Mechanism) and 
EDD(Eye Direction Detector) are aH hypothesised to be basic mental structures. 
Therefore, Baron-Cohen suggests implicitly that there are in fact basic affective and 
cognitive pathways to autism, provided that we accept that the SAM and the EDD 
are more 'affective' than the ToMM. Previously, Hobson (1993) had stated that the 
basic difference between his own thesis and that of Leslie (1987) was that Leslie 
proposed that the symbol structures came first and the knowledge of mental states 
second, with Hobson proposing the opposite.
M| I^eslie’s| 'decoupling mechanism' is innate; it does not develop through 
social experience; it has nothing to do with feelings; it leads to (rather than 
derives from) the ability to recognise the nature of mental states."
(Hobson, 1993, p.208)
Baron-Cohen might still hold that these things are true within the ToMM, but not 
necessarily for the EDD and the SAM. Therefore, Baron-Cohen's (1994) account 
of autism implies both affective and social bases for symbolic life, and autism. We
could consider that this leaves the old opposition of Hobson (1993) and l^eslie 
(1987) rather redundant.
8.5 Conclusions
On the basis of the results presented here, it is not possible to adopt the 
interpersonal approach in explaining the symbolic play of autistic children. Some 
evidence was found of an effect of music on the symbolic play of non-autistic 
children. There was also some tenuous evidence that symbolic play, affect and 
attention might be interdependent in autistic children. Evidence of symbolic play 
impairment was not found consistently, casting doubt on the other findings 
presented. Finally, there was less referential looking by children with autism while 
they were playing, but this was not found to be related to their symbolic play.
Methodological issues, particularly the failure of the studies to detect a symbolic 
play impairment, cast doubt on the other findings. The importance of 
methodological issues in studies of symbolic play in autistic children has been 
highlighted by Jarrold et al. (1993).
Both the theory of mind approach and the interpersonal relatedness approach have 
encountered uncomfortable evidence but also considerable empirical support, so 
neither can be convincingly discounted on the basis of published evidence, and 
certainly not by the evidence presented here.
Finally, we might argue that accounts of autism are becoming more integrative, 
including both affective and cognitive elements in their proposed mechanisms (e.g. 
Baron-Cohen, 1994; Rogers and Pennington, 1991).
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Appendix 2.1.
Full Instructions for Items in the Performance Task (Chapters 2 and 4)
102
Realistic Toys
( 1) brush - 'Show me the brush cleaning the floor'
(2) pickup truck - 'Show me the truck towing the car'
(3) spoon - 'Show me how you eat some soup'
(4) cow - 'Show me how the cow eats the grass'
(5) car - 'Show me how the car drives along the road'
(6) gate - 'Show me how the cow goes through the gate'
(7) bowl - 'Show me how to stir the rice pudding'
(8) motorbike - 'Show me how the motorbike races away'
Nonrealistic Toys
(1) blocks - 'Show me how the carpark is made for the car to park in/ 
dolly makes a seat'
(2) rubber - 'Show me how the car stops at the ramp/dolly holds her 
case'
(3) counter - 'Show me how the car goes around the roundaboul/dolly 
rolls the hoop'
(4) box - 'Show me how the car goes into the garagc/dolly goes in and 
out of the rain'
(5) stick - 'Show me how the car crashes into the barrier/dolly holds the 
flag'
(6) foil - 'Show me how the car/dolly slips on the ice’
(7) felt - 'Show me how the car travels down the road/dolly walks 
down the path'
(8) playdough - 'Show me how the car/dolly gets stuck in the mud'
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Appendix 2.2 One-Way Repeated-Measures ANOVA analyses for Study I
MS df F P
Elicited symbolic play 18.8 1 31.3 0.0
Error 0.6 17
Instructed symbolic play 
Error
2.2
1.1
1
17
0.9 0.2
Modelled symbolic play 1.8 1 4.9 0.1
Error 0.4 17
Elicited non-symbolic play 10.0 1 5.2 0.1
Error 1.9 17
Instructed non-symbolic play 0.1 1 0.2 0.7
Error 0.1 17
Instances of no response 1.9 1 3.8 0.1
Error 0.4 17
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Appendix 3.1 Affect/Attention Rating Scale
Name........................  Date..........
Completed by.......................................
1. The child looks to be 'in good mood'. SD D N A SA
2.The child looks sad. SD D N A SA
3.The child is not enjoying the task. SD D N A SA
4.The child is engaged happily in the task. SD D N A SA
5.The child is 'having a good time'. SD D N A SA
6.The child looks fed up. SD D N A SA
7.This child is simply happy. SD D N A SA
8.The child seems content to play with the toys. SD D N A SA
9.The child seems discontented. SD D N A SA
10. The child looks unhappy enough to want to stop. SD D N A SA
11 .The child seems interested in what s/he is shown. SD D N A SA
12.The child is spending all his/her time on the game. SD D N A SA
l3.The game is not holding the child's attention. SD D N A SA
!4.The child is being easily distracted. SD D N A SA
l5.The child is absorbed in the game. SD D N A SA
lô.The child is doing what s/he is asked immediately. SD D N A SA
l7.The child looks as if s/he would prefer to be elsewhere. SD D N A SA
IS.The child is being very attentive. SD D N A SA
l9.The child is not concentrating on the task. SD D N A SA
20.The child is not following the instructions carefully. SD D N A SA
Appendix 4 .1 Analyses of Variance of Condition by Group for Play
MS df E P
Elicited Symbolic Play
Group (between-subjects) 27.7 1 4.0 0.06
Error 6.9 24
Condition (within-subjects) 3.8 1 2.3 0.1
Interaction 0.7 1 0.4 0.5
Error 1.6 24
Instructed Symbolic Play
Group 0.6 1 0.3 0.6
Error 2.4 24
Condition 0.1 1 0.0 0.8
Interaction 0.7 1 0.3 0.6
Error 2.3 24
Modelled Symbolic Play
Group 0.8 1 0.1 0.8
Error 1.2 24
Condition 0.7 1 0.8 0.4
Interaction 1.2 1 1.3 0.3
Error 0.9 24
Elicited Non symbolic Play
Group 1.9 1 0.2 0.6
Error 7.6 24
Condition 0.3 1 0.1 0.7
Interaction 0.0 1 0.0 1.0
Error 2.6 24
Instructed Non-symbolic Play
(iroup 3.2 1 l.l 0.3
Error 2.8 24
Condition 5.6 1 3.5 0.1
Interaction 0.2 1 0.1 0.7
Error 1.6 24
Modelled Non-symbolic Play
(iroup 0.0 1 0.0 0.9
Error 0.7 24
Condition 1.6 1 2.1 0.2
Interaction 0.2 1 0.2 0.6
Error 0.7 24
Instances of No Response
(iroup 17.3 1 5.6 0.03
Error 3.1 24
Condition 0.7 1 0.7 0.3
Interaction 0.3 1 0.5 0.5
Error 0.6 24
Appendix 5.1 Rating Scale for Attention and Affect Dav-to-Dav Variation
Teacher / Rater Student ..................  Trial 1/2/3
(SD = strongly disagree. D = disagree, N = neither. A = agree. SA = strongly agree)
1. The child has been 'in a good mood' today.
2. The child has been sad today.
3. The child has not enjoyed today's tasks.
4. The child has been engaged happily today's tasks.
5. The child has been 'having a good time' today.
6. The child has seemed fed up today.
7. This child has been simply happy.
8. The child seems content today.
9. The child seems discontented today.
10. The child looks too unhappy to participate today.
11. The child has been interested in what s/he has been shown.
12. The child has been spending all his/her time on today's tasks.
13. Today's tasks are not holding the child's attention.
14. The child has been easily distracted today.
15. The child has been absorbed in today's activities.
16. The child has been doing what s/he is asked immediately.
SD D N A SA 
SD D N A SA 
SD D N A SA 
SD D N A SA 
SD D N A SA 
SD D N A SA 
SD D N A SA 
SD D N A SA 
SD D N A SA 
SD D N A SA
SD D N A SA
SD D N A SA 
SD D N A SA 
SD D N A SA 
SD D N A SA
SD D N A SA 
SD D N A SA 
SD D N A SA 
SD D N A SA
17. The child looks as if s/he would prefer to be elsewhere.
18. The child has been very attentive today.
19. The child has been not concentrating today.
20. The child has not been following instructions carefully today. SD D N A SA
Please mark on the following line how you think the child's mood has been overall; 
Negative mood________________________ Positive Mood
Appendix 6 .1 Full Instructions for the Play Task (Chapter 6)
( 1) blocks-'Show me how teddy makes a table with the blocks'
(2) rubber-'Show me how teddy reads the book'
(3) tubular plastic-'Show me how teddy has a drink'
(4) short stick-'Show me how teddy waves the flag'
(5) felt-'Show me how teddy walks along the road' 
playdough-'Show me how teddy sticks in the mud'( 6 )
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Appendix 6.2 One-Way ANOVA Analyses of Group Differences in Play for Study 4
MS df F P
Elicited symbolic play 0.0 1 0.2 0.7
Error 1.9 24
Instructed symbolic play 0.0 1 0.0 1.0
Error 1.2 24
Modelled symbolic play l.l 1 1.1 0.3
Error 0.0 24
Elicited non-symbolic play 3.6 1 1.0 0.3
Error 3.6 24
Instructed non-symbolic play 0.1 1 0.5 0.5
Error 0.1 24
Modelled non-symbolic play 0.4 1 1.2 0.3
Error 0.4 24
Instances of no response 3.6 1 0.9 0.4
Error 4.0 24
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( 1 )
( 2 )
(3 )
(4)
(5)
(6 )
(7 )
(8 )
(9)
( 10)
( 11)
( 12)
( 13)
( 14)
( 15)
( 16)
( 17)
( 18)
Appendix 7 . 1
blocks-'Show me how teddy makes a table with the blocks'
makes a seat 
makes a bridge
tubular plastic-'Show me how teddy has a drink'
looks through 
wears the hat
rubber-'Show me how teddy reads the book'
carries the tray 
eats the chocolate
felt-'Show me how teddy walks along the road'
sleeps under his blanket 
wears his coat
short stick-'Show me how teddy waves the flag'
writes with the pen 
climbs the tree
playdough-'Show me how teddy sticks in the mud'
eats the cake 
kicks the ball
hull Instructions for the Play Task (Chapter 7)
Appendix 7.2 Bv-Group Friedman Two-Wav Analyses for the Effects of Occasion
on All Variables 
Variable
Autism Group 
Friedman Test Statistic probability
Elicited Symbolic Play 0.15 0.928
Instructed Symbolic Play 3.75 0.153
Modelled Symbolic Play 0.00 1.000
Elicited Nonsymbolic Play 0.20 0.905
Instructed Nonsymbolic Play 0.60 0.741
Modelled Nonsymbolic Play 1.95 0.377
Instances of No Response 0.95 0.622
Number of Seconds Attending
to Experimenter 3.80 0.150
Background Variables:
Number of Smiles 3.75 0.153
Number of Seconds Smiling 3.95 0.139
Number of Seconds Attending
to Toy 1.85 0.397
Number of Seconds Attending 
Elsewhere 0.60 0.741
Appendix 7.2 (contd.) By-Group Friedman Two-Way Analyses for the Effects of
Occasion on All Variables
Control Group
Variable Eriedman Test Statistic probability
Hlicited Symbolic Play 0.95 0.622
Instructed Symbolic Play 0.65 0.723
Modelled Symbolic Play 0.00 1.000
Elicited Nonsymbolic Play 1.40 0.497
Instructed Nonsymbolic Play 0.00 1.000
Modelled Nonsymbolic Play 0.15 0.928
Instances of No Response 0.45 0.799
Number of Seconds Attending
to Experimenter 0.95 0.622
Background Variables:
Number of Smiles 3.05 0.218
Number of Seconds Smiling 0.60 0.741
Number of Seconds Attending 
to Toy 3.65 0.161
Number of Seconds Attending 
Elsewhere 2.15 0.341
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Appendix 7.3 Two-way ANOVA analyses of Occasion by Group for Play (Study 5)
Variable MS df F
Seconds Attending to 
Experimenter
Group
(between-subject) 476.0 1 9.99 0.01
Error 47.6 18
Occasion
(within-subject) 62.5 2 2.4 0.1
Interaction 80.5 2 3.1 0.1
Hrror 25.9 36
Elicited Symbolic Play
Group 8.1 1 1.5 0.2
Hrror 5.3 18
Occasion 1.3 2 l.l 0.3
Interaction 0.2 2 0.2 0.8
Hrror 1.2 36
Instructed Symbolic Play
Group 4.3 1 1.4 0.3
Hrror 3.2 18
Occasion 1.4 2 1.3 0.3
Interaction 1.3 2 1.1 0.3
Hrror 1.1 36
Modelled Symbolic Play
Group 0.6 1 0.9 0.4
Hrror 0.7 18
Occasion 0.1 2 0.1 0.9
Interaction 0.4 2 0.7 0.5
Hrror 0.5 36
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Appendix 7.3 (contd.)
Elicited Non-Symholic Play
MS df F P
Group 4.3 1 3.9 0.1
Krror l.l 18
Occasion 0.2 2 0.4 0.7
Interaction 0.5 2 0.9 0.4
Error 0.6 36
Instructed Non-Symholic Play
Group 0.4 1 1.5 0.2
Error 0.3 18
Occasion 0.1 2 0.3 0.8
Interaction 0.1 2 0.3 0.8
Error 0.4 36
Modelled Non-Symholic Play
Group 0.3 1 1.9 0.2
Error 0.1 18
Occasion 0.5 2 3.0 0.1
Interaction 0.3 2 1.7 0.2
Error 0.2 36
Instances o f No Response
Group 2.0 1 1.0 0.3
Error 2.0 18
Occasion 0.4 2 0.6 0.5
Interaction 0.8 2 1.4 0.2
Error 0.6 36
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